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Introduction 
East Asia´s catching-up in the electronics industry during the late 20
th century provides a 
fascinating example of the catalytic role that linkages with foreign firms can play for industrial 
development (e.g., Borrus, Ernst, Haggard, 2000; Ernst, 1997a): an early integration into GPNs 
has provided Asian producers with access to the industry`s main growth markets, helping to 
compensate for the initially small size of their domestic markets. Network participation also 
provided new opportunities, pressures and incentives for Asian network suppliers to upgrade their 
technological and management capabilities (Ernst and Kim, 2002). As a result, East Asia has 
emerged as the dominant global manufacturing base of the electronics industry, especially for 
assembly and component manufacturing. 
  This growth pattern has survived the 1997 financial crisis (Ernst, 2001a). The “New 
Economy” boom in the U.S. provided an additional boost, increasing demand for Asian 
electronics exports
1. But there are limits to export-led growth and recent transformations of GPNs 
force us to reconsider the region’s IU perspectives within these networks. The downturn in the 
                                                           
1 The size of this investment-led demand boost for Asian exports can be gathered from the following data: Almost 
half of the U.S. capital investment since 1997 went into information technology, up from less than 24% during the 
early 1990s. And roughly 40% of the US consumption of computers and semiconductors is imported, largely from 
East Asia . 
   2
global electronics industry since late 2000 has brutally exposed the downside of export-led 
industrialization: a country is more vulnerable, the higher the share of electronics in its exports, 
the greater its integration into GPNs, and the more the country depends on exports to the US.  
There is a broad consensus that an upgrading of East Asia’s electronics industry is overdue 
(e.g., Ministry of Information and Communication, 2002, on Korea; Chen, 2002, on Taiwan; Toh, 
2002, on Penang/Malaysia; Ariffin, 2000, on Malaysia; Simon, 2001). Defined as a shift to higher 
value-added products, services and production stages through increasing specialization and 
efficient domestic and international linkages, industrial upgrading (IU) necessitates a strong 
domestic knowledge base (e.g., Ernst, 2002d). Building on existing strengths in volume 
manufacturing, IU requires the development of complementary skills and capabilities in design 
and development (including new product introduction), as well as in “embedded” software, SOC 
design, IP trade, system integration, and in the management of resources, supply chains and 
customer relations. Of critical importance is a capacity to bring in at short notice specialized 
experts from overseas who can help bridge existing knowledge gaps and who can catalyze 
necessary changes in organization and procedures required to develop these capabilities locally. 
Successful upgrading raises daunting challenges, chief among them are substantial 
investments in long-term assets, such as specialized skills and capabilities. This chapter explores 
how East Asia’s upgrading perspectives in the electronics industry are affected by three important 
transformations in global production networks (GPNs): i) vertical specialization: the emergence of 
increasingly complex “networks of networks” that juxtapose “original equipment manufacturers” 
(OEMs) and global, U.S.-based “contract manufacturers” (CMs); ii) coordination & contents: the 
increasing use of digital information systems to manage these networks, and to build “global 
information service networks” (GISN) that complement networks centered on manufacturing;  and   3
iii) location: the emergence of China as a priority investment target for GPNs in the electronics 
industry.  
We argue that these transformations of GPNs provide new opportunities for IU, as barriers 
to international knowledge diffusion are gradually reduced. We also emphasize that rising 
requirements for participation in these networks are putting pressures on mid-sized countries and 
especially local small-and medium-sized Asian suppliers. We illustrate the difficulties of devising 
realistic upgrading strategies, and discuss policies and support institutions that could help to 
successfully implement these strategies.  
  It is difficult in one paper to consider the entire range of upgrading perspectives that face 
the countries of East Asia. We focus on Malaysia
2, a country that faces a particularly demanding 
challenge, due to four peculiar characteristics of its electronics industry: First, Malaysia exceeds 
most other Asian electronics producers (with the exception of Singapore), in terms of its 
vulnerability to the vicissitudes of export-led growth: electronics constitutes around 60% of its 
exports; its electronics industry is heavily exposed to GPN; and the US market absorbs 25% of its 
total exports (an estimated 40% for electronics exports). Second, with its focus on low-end 
assembly-type volume manufacturing, and a weak domestic supply base, this mid-sized country is 
especially exposed to the emergence of China as a new competitor. Third, with the Penang 
Development Centre, with its two industrial master plans
3, and with the Bill of Guarantees 
(developed for its Multimedia Super Corridor), Malaysia has developed one of the most 
aggressive sets of upgrading incentives for private companies (both foreign and domestic). And 
yet, fourth, despite such policies, Malaysia has failed to develop a sufficiently diversified and deep 
                                                           
2 For related studies on upgrading perspectives in Korea’s and Taiwan’s electronics industry, see Ernst, 1994b, 2000a, 
and 2001b. 
3 Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1986 and 1996.   4
industrial structure, to induce a critical mass of corporate investment in specialized skills and 
capabilities.   
  A focus on Malaysia helps to highlight three important propositions that should inform the 
study of upgrading perspectives in East Asia’s electronics industry: First, as long as peculiar 
characteristics of industry structure constrain the incentives for firms to invest in long-term assets 
(e.g., specialized skills), upgrading perspectives will remain limited. Second, while investment 
incentives and infrastructure matter, the key to success is the development of specialized skills and 
innovative capabilities, ahead of what the market would provide. Of critical importance are 
incentive alignments for university professors, researchers and students that encourage close 
interaction with private sector (through, e.g., company internships and sabbaticals). Equally 
important are training institutions, jointly run by the private and public sector, like the Penang 
Skills Development Centre (PSDC).  
  Third, in countries where the domestic industry structure keeps constraining upgrading 
efforts, international linkages through participation in GPNs can play an important catalytic role. 
In such a situation, it is critical to understand whether and how the current transformations of 
GPNs can help to bypass the above domestic upgrading constraints. We argue that there is now 
greater scope for diversifying international network linkages, beyond the erstwhile exclusive 
linkages with OEMs, and that this could facilitate the upgrading into more knowledge-intensive 
production and services.  
Section 1 sketches key characteristics of GPNs and introduces an operational definition of 
industrial upgrading (IU). In sections 2 to 4, we outline the aforementioned transformations of 
GPNs in East Asia`s electronics industry. Finally, in section 5, we ask how the upgrading 
prospects of Malaysian electronics firms are affected by the above transformations of GPNs.   5
Specifically, we explore whether these transformations provide new opportunities for relieving 
domestic upgrading constraints, outline feasible responses and identify options for further 
analysis.  
 
1. Conceptual Framework: Global Production Networks and Industrial Upgrading 
  1.1. Characteristics of GPNs
4 
Trade economists have recently discovered the importance of changes in the organization 
of international production as a determinant of trade patterns (e.g., Feenstra, 1998; Jones and 
Kierzskowski, 2000; Navaretti, Haaland, Venables, 2002). Their work demonstrates that (i) 
production is increasingly “fragmented” with parts of the production process being scattered 
across a number of countries, hence increasing share of trade in parts and components; and (ii) 
countries and regions which have been able to become a part of the global production network are 
the ones which have industrialized the fastest. And leading growth economists (e.g., Grossmann 
and Helpmann, 2002), are basing their models on a systematic analysis of global sourcing 
strategies. 
This chapter builds on this work, but uses a broader concept of GPNs that emphasizes 
three characteristics: i) scope: GPN encompass all stages of the value chain, not just production; 
ii) asymmetry: flagships dominate control over network resources and decision-making; and iii) 
knowledge diffusion: the sharing of knowledge is the necessary glue that keeps these networks 
growing. 
A GPN covers both intra-firm and inter-firm transactions and forms of coordination: it 
links together the flagship´s own subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures with its subcontractors, 
                                                           
4 For details, see Ernst, 1997b, 2002a,Borrus, Ernst and Haggard, 2000, and Ernst, forthcoming.   6
suppliers, service providers, as well as partners in strategic alliances. While equity ownership is 
not essential, network governance is distinctively asymmetric. A network flagship like IBM or 
Intel breaks down the value chain into a variety of discrete functions and locates them wherever 
they can be carried out most effectively, where they improve the firm’s access to resources and 
capabilities and where they are needed to facilitate the penetration of important growth markets. 
The main purpose of these networks is to provide the flagship with quick and low-cost access to 
resources, capabilities and knowledge that are complementary to its core competencies. As the 
flagship integrates geographically dispersed production, customer and knowledge bases into 
GPNs, this may well produce transaction cost savings. Yet, the real benefits result from the 
dissemination, exchange and outsourcing of knowledge and complementary capabilities ( Ernst, 
2002c)..  
GPNs typically combine a rapid geographic dispersion with spatial concentration on a 
growing but still limited number of specialized clusters. To simplify, we distinguish two types of 
clusters (Ernst, 2002c): “centers of excellence” that combine unique resources, such as R&D and 
precision mechanical engineering, and “cost and time reduction centers” that thrive on the timely 
provision of lower-cost services
5. Different clusters face different IU perspectives, depending on 
their specialization, and on the product composition of the GPNs. The dispersion of clusters 
differs across the value chain: it increases, the closer one gets to the final product, while 
dispersion remains concentrated especially for high-precision and design-intensive components
6. 
                                                           
5 “Cost & time reduction centers” include the usual suspects in Asia (Korea, Taiwan, China, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
now also India for software engineering and web services),but also exist in once peripheral locations in Europe (e.g., 
Ireland, Central and Eastern Europe and Russia),  in Brazil, and Mexico in Latin America, in some Caribbean 
locations ( like Costa Rica), and in a few spots elsewhere in the socalled RoW (= rest of the world). 
6 On one end of the spectrum is final PC assembly that is widely dispersed to major growth markets in the US, Europe 
and Asia. Dispersion is still quite extended for standard, commodity-type components, but less so than for final 
assembly. For instance, flagships can source keyboards, computer mouse devices and power switch supplies from 
many different sources, both in Asia, Mexico and the European periphery, with Taiwanese firms playing an important   7
In short, agglomeration economies continue to matter, hence the path-dependent nature of 
upgrading trajectories for individual specialized clusters. 
Flagships 
 GPN typically consist of various hierarchical layers, ranging from network flagships that 
dominate such networks, due to their capacity for system integration (Pavitt, 2002), down to a 
variety of usually smaller, local specialized network suppliers. The flagship is at the heart of a 
network: it provides strategic and organizational leadership beyond the resources that, from an 
accounting perspective, lie directly under its management control (Rugman, 1997: 182). The 
strategy of the flagship company thus directly affects the growth, the strategic direction and 
network position of lower-end participants, like specialized suppliers and subcontractors. The 
latter, in turn, “ have no reciprocal influence over the flagship strategy” (Rugman and D´Cruz, 
2000, p.84). The flagship derives its strength from its control over critical resources and 
capabilities that facilitate innovation, and from its capacity to coordinate transactions and 
knowledge exchange between the different network nodes.  
Flagships retain in-house activities in which they have a particular strategic advantage; 
they outsource those in which they do not. It is important to emphasize the diversity of such 
outsourcing patterns (Ernst,1997b). Some flagships focus on design, product development and 
marketing, outsourcing volume manufacturing and related support services. Other flagships 
outsource as well a variety of high-end, knowledge-intensive support services. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
role as intermediate supply chain coordinators. The same is true for printed circuit boards. Concentration of 
dispersion increases, the more we move toward more complex, capital-intensive precision components: memory 
devices and displays are sourced primarily from “centers of excellence” in Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore; and 
hard disk drives from a Singapore-centered triangle of locations in Southeast Asia. Finally, dispersion becomes most 
concentrated for high-precision, design-intensive components that pose the most demanding requirements on the mix 
of capabilities that a firm and its cluster needs to master: microprocessors for instance are sourced from a few globally 
dispersed affiliates of Intel, two American suppliers, and one recent entrant from Taiwan (Via Technologies).   8
To move this model a bit closer to reality, we distinguish two types of global flagships: i) 
“Original equipment manufacturers” (OEM) that derive their market power from selling global 
brands, regardless of whether design and production is done in-house or outsourced; and ii) U.S.-
based global “contract manufacturers” (CM) that establish their own GPN to provide integrated 
manufacturing and global supply chain services (often including design) to the OEM.  
Asian suppliers 
To determine whether a local company in Asia is integrated into a GPN, we have used a 
broad set of indicators that include: i) use of dedicated parts supplied by a foreign firm; or ii) 
contract manufacturing of parts or final products to the specifications of a  foreign firm; or iii) 
contract manufacturing of parts or final products, based on own design; or iv) the provision of 
knowledge support services to foreign firm.  
It is necessary to open the black box of “Asian suppliers”. First, some of these suppliers 
have been around for quite a while. Since the 1960s, various groups of Asian suppliers have 
emerged, first in consumer electronics, then as contract chip assemblers (Korea’s Anam as the 
most prominent example), and, more recently, in contract wafer fabrication (“silicon foundries”), 
and as ODM suppliers of computers and related equipment, IC design houses, suppliers of PDA 
and wireless devices. Second, Asian suppliers obviously differ considerably in their capabilities, 
network position and market power. Substantial differences also exist with regard to their capacity 
for component sourcing, design & development and engineering, the capacity to provide global 
support services, and the use of digital information systems.  
Greatly simplifying, we distinguish two types of Asian suppliers: higher-tier and lower-tier 
suppliers. “Higher-tier” suppliers, like for instance Taiwan´s Acer group (Ernst, 2000c), play an 
intermediary role between global flagships and local suppliers. They deal directly with global   9
flagships (both “brand leaders” and global US-based “contract manufacturers”),  they possess 
valuable proprietary assets (including technology); and they have developed their own mini-GPNs 
(Chen, 2002). Building on their strengths in volume manufacturing and the provision of ODM 
services
7, these higher-tier suppliers are now under pressure to develop complementary skills and 
capabilities in new product introduction (NPI), process re-engineering), as well as in “embedded” 
software, SOC (system-on-chip) design, IP trade, system integration, and in the management of 
network resources, supply chains and customer relations. With the exception of hard-core R&D 
and strategic marketing that remain under the control of the global brand leader, Asian higher-tier 
suppliers must be able to shoulder all steps in the value chain. They must even take on the 
coordination functions necessary for global supply chain management. 
“Lower-tier” Asian suppliers are the weakest link in the GPNs. Their main competitive 
advantages are low cost and speed, and flexibility of delivery. They are typically used as “price 
breakers” and “capacity buffers”, and can be dropped at short notice. This second group of local 
suppliers rarely deals directly with the global flagships; they interact primarily with local higher-
tier suppliers. Lower-tier suppliers normally lack proprietary assets; their financial  resources are 
inadequate to invest in training and R&D; and they are highly vulnerable to abrupt changes in 
markets and technology, and to financial crises. 
1.2.Industrial Upgrading
8 
An appropriate long-term development strategy for Asian electronics industries must focus 
on improvements in specialization, productivity, and linkages (as defined by Hirschman, 1958, 
chapter 6), all of which necessitate a braod base of skills and capabilities. All four elements are 
essential prerequisites for improving a country's capacity to raise long-term capital that is 
                                                           
7 An ODM service provider is defined    10
necessary for facility investment, R&D, and human resource development. The concept of 
industrial upgrading (IU) ties these four elements together in a cohesive framework to serve as a 
focusing device for unlocking new sources of economic growth
9. Critical prerequisites for 
successful upgrading are a sufficiently large pool of specialized and re-trainable skills, a strong 
domestic knowledge base, forms of corporate governance that facilitate innovation, sophisticated 
information management, and strong international knowledge linkages. 
Our definition emphasizes the importance of international linkages. We do not assume that 
IU ends at the national border, and that it occurs only if improved specialization generates 
pressures to create dense forward and backward linkages within the district or the national 
economy. A “closed economy” assumption is unrealistic, as globalization and information 
technology (IT) have drastically increased the international mobility of trade, investment, and 
even knowledge (Ernst, 2002c). This increases the scope for cross-border forward and backward 
linkages, in a similar manner that improved specialization generates pressures to create dense 
forward and backward linkages within the economy (Ernst, 2002 a).  
Equally important, most countries are constrained by a narrow domestic knowledge base 
and limited linkages. Both constraints are particularly important for small developing economies. 
One of their primary features is a narrow and incomplete set of domestic linkages (e.g, Lall, 1997; 
Ernst, Ganiatsos, and Mytelka, 1998). The result is an “inverted production pyramid”: a growing 
final product sector rests on a weak and much smaller domestic base of mostly inefficient support 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
8 Based on Ernst, 2002 d. 
9  By focusing on knowledge and innovation as major sources of economic growth, our approach is consistent with 
leading-edge economic thinking, such as endogenous growth theories (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991); 
Lipsey`s  structuralist  growth theory (e.g., Lipsey, 2001); evolutionary economics (e.g., Penrose, 1959/1995; 
Richardson, 1960/1990; Nelson and Winter, 1982); and attempts to reunite economic growth and innovation theory 
and business history (e.g., Lazonick, 2000). A focus on knowledge and innovation also reflects a recent shift in policy 
debates within important international institutions, such as the OECD, the World Bank, and the European 
Commission.   11
industries. Rapid growth in the final products sector necessitates considerable imports of 
intermediates and production equipment. In addition, highly heterogeneous economic structures 
constrain agglomeration economies; weak and unstable economic institutions obstruct learning 
efficiency; and a high vulnerability to volatile global currency and financial markets constrain 
patient capital that is necessary for the development of a broad domestic knowledge base. As a 
result of this “vicious circle”, very limited sharing and pooling of resources and knowledge occurs 
within the country, and often even within the export-oriented cluster. This implies that our model 
of IU needs to integrate international knowledge linkages. To compensate for their narrow 
domestic knowledge base and limited linkages, Asian developing economies have to rely on 
foreign sources of knowledge to catalyze domestic capability formation. International linkages 
need to prepare the way for an upgrading of East Asia’s electronics industries.  
We focus on two aspects of industrial upgrading found in the literature:  "firm-level 
upgrading" from low-end to higher-end products and value chain stages, and "industry-level 
linkages" with support industries, universities and research institutes. Without the latter, “firm-
level upgrading” will soon reach its limits.
10 We emphasize two additional features that 
distinguish our concept of IU. First, we include firm behavior as a key dimension, allowing for a 
co-evolution of industry structure and firm behavior in response to actions of key participants and 
also to the policy environment. And second, we use a broad definition of innovation that allows us 
                                                           
10 The other three forms of IU are:  (i) inter-industry upgrading proceeding from low value-added industries (e.g. light 
industries) to higher value-added industries (e.g. heavy and higher-tech industries);  (ii) inter-factor upgrading 
proceeding from endowed assets (i.e., natural resources and unskilled labor) to created assets (physical capital, skilled 
labor, social capital); and (iii) upgrading of demand within a hierarchy of consumption, proceeding from necessities 
to conveniences to luxury goods.  See Ozawa (2000) for discussion of upgrading taxonomies.  Most research has 
focused on a combination of the first two forms of IU, based on a distinction between low-wage, low-skill “sun-set” 
industries and high-wage, high-skill “sunrise” industries. Such simple dichotomies however have failed to produce 
convincing results, for two reasons: First, there are low-wage, low-skill value stages in even the most high-tech 
industry, and high-wage, high-skill activities exist even in so-called traditional industries like textiles. And second, 
both the capability requirements and the boundaries of a particular “industry” keep changing over time, which makes 
an analytical focus on the industry level even more problematic.    12
to move beyond a narrow focus on R&D and patenting.
11 There is now a widespread consensus 
that a broad definition of “innovation efforts” is needed that includes engineering, technology 
purchases, expenditures on licensing and consulting services, and technology search, as well as 
the accumulation of tacit knowledge required to absorb imported technology (e.g., Nelson, 1990). 
That broader focus is necessary to capture the proliferation of knowledge-intensive professional 
services, made possible by ICT. 
 
2. Networks of Networks: Outsourcing Based on Contract Manufacturing 
The “New Economy” boom in the US has accelerated a long-standing trend toward 
vertical specialization in the electronics industry: outsourcing based on contract manufacturing 
became the ”panacea of the ‘90s”(Lakenan et al ,2001: p3), a “New American Model of Industrial 
Organization” (Sturgeon, 2002). Two inter-related transformations need to be distinguished: 
supply contracts and M&A. Global brand leaders like Dell, the  “original equipment 
manufacturers” (OEMs)  increasingly subcontract manufacturing and related services to US-based 
global “contract manufacturers” (CMs), like Flextronics. Equally important however is that the 
very same CMs have acquired existing facilities of OEMs, as the latter are divesting internal 
manufacturing capacity, seeking to allocate capital to other activities that are expected to generate 
higher profit margins, such as sales and marketing, and product development.  
2.1. Argument 
                                                           
11  Most empirical work on IU has explored the expansion of R&D-intensive industries. For most developing 
countries, that narrow focus is of very limited value.The (usually) implicit notion is that potential rates of productivity 
growth are higher in “emergent”, R&D-intensive industries (Globerman, 1997, pages 98 and 99). Hence, “… 
specializing in the “right” technological activities directly contributes to faster growth rates of real income”. A related 
notion is that, for R&D-intensive industries, economic rents can be extracted, in part, from foreign consumers. A 
specialization in the “right” technological activities contributes to higher levels of national income by promoting more 
favourable international terms of trade.   13
  Sturgeon and Lester, 2002 (in this volume) emphasize that the rise of U.S. contract 
manufacturers with global reach may pose a serious competitive threat to Asian suppliers. Their 
analysis highlights rising threshold requirements for supplier participation in GPNs. 
Complementing their analysis, we highlight the other side of the coin, and explore how Asian 
suppliers can exploit linkages with US-based contract manufacturers, that now complement the 
original linkages with OEMs, for their upgrading purposes. More specifically, we ask what new 
upgrading opportunities may open up for Asian suppliers, as outsourcing based on contract 
manufacturing has created increasingly complex, multi-tier “networks of networks” that juxtapose 
global ties among the two large global players (the OEMs and CMs), as well as intense regional 
ties with smaller firms (as argued, for instance, in Almeida and Kogut, 1997).  
  A focus on complex, multi-tier “networks of networks” distinguishes our analysis from 
Sturgeon’s modular production network model (2002).  That model focuses on two actors only: 
global OEMs and CMs, most of them of American origin. OEMs and CMs are perceived to 
interact in a virtuous circle where each of them can only win. In that model, nothing can stop 
continuous outsourcing through contract manufacturing: “turn-key suppliers and lead firms co-
evolve in a recursive cycle of outsourcing and increasing supply-base capability and scale, which 
makes the prospects for additional outsourcing more attractive” (Sturgeon, 2002, p.6). If that 
scenario would materialize, Asian suppliers in the global electronics industry may face a 
considerable backlash. Specifically, Asian suppliers may be unable to compete against the vastly 
superior capabilities of US-based CMs in four areas: component sourcing; design, development 
and engineering (D&D&E); “global reach”: the  provision of support services across multiple 
locations in all major macro-regions;  and “network coordination”: improved network efficiencies 
through the use of sophisticated digital information systems.   14
Our analysis leads us to a less gloomy perspective. Asian suppliers already play an 
important role as global CMs. We highlight peculiar features of the US-style CM model that may 
indicate possible limitations of that model. We argue that the US model of contract manufacturing 
is just one possible approach, and that Asian electronics firms may have a role to play, based on 
their accumulated experience with contract manufacturing, before it was given that name.. 
Furthermore, there are ample opportunities to groom a variety of new specialized Asian suppliers, 
provided necessary changes are put in place in policies and support institutions. 
To back-up this argument, we highlight three peculiar features of the US-style CM model: 
the critical role played by financial considerations (2.2); the as yet limited share of contract 
manufacturing in worldwide electronics hardware production (2.3); and the limited presence of  
American CMs in Asia relative to their presence in the Americas and Europe (2.4). In section 2.5., 
we will explore how the downturn in the global electronics industry has exposed serious 
limitations of these arrangements, forcing both OEMs and CMs to adjust and rationalize the 
organization of their networks. All of this has important implications for upgrading perspectives in 
Malaysia’s electronics industry that we will discuss in section 5. 
2.2. Drivers 
Outsourcing through subcontracting has a long history in the electronics industry (Boswell, 
1993). Yet, during the 1990s, outsourcing gained a new quality, spreading across borders: global 
brand leaders (OEM) have put up for sale a growing number of their overseas facilities, and in 
some cases whole chunks of their global production networks. OEM from North America like HP, 
Dell, Compaq, Motorola, Intel, IBM, Lucent, Nortel were first in pursuing such divestment 
strategies. But European OEM (e.g., Philips, Ericcson, Siemens) and, more recently, Japanese 
ones (e.g., NEC, Fujitsu, Sony) have followed suit. The main driver are financial considerations:   15
getting rid of low-margin manufacturing helps the OEMs to increase shareholder returns
12. Other 
expected benefits include hedging against losses due to volatile markets and periodic excess 
capacity; scale economies: surface-mount-technology (SMT) requires large production runs, 
reflecting its growing capital and knowledge intensity; and an improved capacity to combine cost 
reduction, product differentiation and time-to-market.  
2.3. Growth and Market Share 
CMs have aggressively seized this opportunity: through acquisitions and capacity 
expansion they have developed, within a few years, their own GPNs that now complement the 
networks established by the OEMs. For instance, Flextronics has 62 plants worldwide, Solectron 
has factories in 70 countries, and the recently merged Sanmina/SCI has 100 factories around the 
world. This gave rise to an extremely rapid growth of the CM industry (figure 1). From 1996 to 
2000, capital expenditures grew 11-fold (50% CAGR), and revenues increased by almost 400% 
(81% CAGR). The industry`s rapid growth was driven primarily by M&A (figure 2).  
 
Fig.1 The Growth of the CM Industry, 1996-2000 
 
Figure 2 M&A in the CM Industry, 1997-2000 
 
It is important however to emphasize the still limited share of US contract manufacturers 
in worldwide electronics hardware production. In 2001, this share was estimated to be around 
13.7% (up from 13.0% in 2000); for 2002, this share is projected to increase to 16.3% (email from  
Eric Miscoll, CEO, Technology Forecasters, Inc, April 15, 2002).  
                                                           
12 In response to pressures from institutional investors and financial analysts, OEM were eager to “slash their balance   16
2.4.  Late Move to East Asia 
The presence of American CMs in East Asia pales relative to their presence in the 
Americas (US, Canada, Mexico, Brazil) and Europe (including Eastern Europe and Israel). The 
move to East Asia came relatively late. During the 1990s, American CMs spent most of their 
money on acquiring global flagship facilities in the Americas and Europe. During the “New 
Economy” boom in the US, speed-to-market due to close proximity was much more important 
than cost considerations. With the slow-down in the electronics industry, cost reduction now again 
has become a central concern. Arguably, this may create new incentives for CMs to expand their 
East Asian networks. 
Let us look at a few illustrative examples (see table 1). Flextronics, which has its 
headquarters in Singapore, has the strongest presence in Asia: 12 facilities in 6 nations, i.e. 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, China, Taiwan, and India. Yet, this compares with a total of 62 
plants worldwide, of which 18 are in the Americas, and 27 in Europe (including two in Israel)
13.  
 
Table 1: Contract Manufacturing Clusters in East Asia, 01/2002 
 
Solectron, the long-time industry leader
14, has factories in 70 countries, but only four of 
these countries are in Asia. Solectron began to increase its presence in Asia only since 2001. This 
is primarily in response to the company’s projections that, by 2005, 60% of its turnover would 
come from Asia (including Japan), up from about 30% in 2001. Traditionally focused on Penang 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
sheets by placing the low-margin operations with hungry contract manufacturers” ((Lakenan et al, 2001: p4).  
13 Reflecting the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific market, Flextronics decided in December 2001 to make 
Malaysia its manufacturing and logistics hub for its operations in the Asia-Pacific region (most likely, excluding 
China, given that Flextronics has five facilities there). 
14 During the 2001 recession, its leadership position is being challenged by Flextronics and by the merger of Sanmina 
and SCI.   17
(since 1991), Solectron has added during 1996 facilities in Johor/Malaysia and Suzhou/Jiansu 
Province in China. During 2000, Solectron acquired two Sony factories, one in Japan and one in 
Taiwan, as well as NEC’s Ibaraki production facilities for servers, workstations and system file 
products
15. The latter acquisition provides Solectron with 500 highly skilled Japanese employees 
who are well trained in build-to-order manufacturing, and final test and fulfillment services.  
The presence in Asia is even more limited for the remaining three major global CM 
players. The recently merged Sanmina/SCI has 100 factories around the world. This compares 
with seven facilities in Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, China, Taiwan and Thailand), but this number 
pales relative to the long list of locations in the Americas and Europe. Celestica, a spin-off from 
IBM Canada in 1994, has 36 plants around the world, acquired through acquisitions. Until mid-
2001, it had four plants in Asia: one in Malaysia’s Kulim Hi-Tech park (part of the northern 
cluster), two in China, and one in Thailand.  Since then, Celestica has substantially expanded its 
Asian presence, to meet the growing outsourcing demands of Japanese OEMs
16.  
Finally, Jabil Circuit, the smallest of the global CM players, has 21 facilities worldwide. 
As with the other CM leaders, Jabil’s presence in Asia (three facilities), lags behind its presence in 
the Americas (11) and Europe (7). Its involvement in Asia started in 1995, with its factory in 
Penang. In 1998, it established its Asian regional headquarters in Hong Kong, and a large low-cost 
manufacturing plant in China´s Gunagzhou Province, in the YiXing Industrial Estate in Panyu
17.  
2.5.  Limitations to the US-Style CM Model 
                                                           
15 For acquisitions of smaller Southeast Asian contract manufacturers by major global CM players, see section 6.4 
below. 
16 The starting-point was an $ 890 million acquisition of Omni, one of Singapore’s leading contract manufacturers 
that added facilities in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. And in January 2002, Celestica acquired two 
optical and broadband equipment factories in Japan from NEC, as part of a five-year $ 2.5bn supply agreement. 
17 Jabil has recently expanded its long-established operations in Penang through the acquisition of Xircom, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of  Intel that supplies PC and network cards (New Straits Times, August 23, 2001).   18
The downturn in the global electronics industry has exposed serious limitations to the US 
model of contract manufacturing, forcing both OEMs and CMs to adjust and rationalize the 
organization of their networks. That model was based on the assumption of uninterrupted demand 
growth. In reality however, demand and supply only rarely match. This simple truth was all but 
forgotten during the heydays of the “New Economy”.  
Industry observers highlight seven important limitations
18: First, global contract 
manufacturing is a highly volatile industry. While powerful forces push for outsourcing, this 
process is by no means irreversible. Major OEMs retain substantial internal manufacturing 
operations; they are continuously evaluating the merits of manufacturing products or providing 
services internally versus the advantages of outsourcing. Second, global CMs are now in a much 
weaker bargaining position than OEMs, whose number has been reduced by the current downturn 
and who are now much more demanding. In principle, important long-term customer contracts 
permit quarterly or other periodic adjustment to pricing based on decreases or increases in 
component prices. In reality however CMs “typically bear the risk of component price increases 
that occur between any such re-pricings or, if such re-pricing is not permitted, during the balance 
of the term of the particular customer contract (Jabil, 10K report 2001, p.49). 
A third important limitation of the US CM model represents trade-offs between 
specialization advantages and rapid inorganic growth through M&A. In economic theory, vertical 
specialization is supposed to increase efficiency, i.e. to reduce the wastage of scarce resources. It 
is not clear whether the recent rapid growth of CM has produced this result. The excessive growth 
and diversification that we have seen during the “New Economy” boom may well truncate the 
specialization and efficiency advantages of the CM model. The leading CMs have aggressively   19
used M&A to pursue in parallel four objectives that do not easily match: rapid growth; a 
broadening of the portfolio of services that they can provide; a diversification into new product 
markets (especially telecom equipment); as well as an expansion of their own production 
networks, establishing a global presence at record speed. Yet, this forced pace of global expansion 
may well create an increasingly cumbersome organization that could undermine the supposedly 
primary advantage of the CM model: a capacity for rapid scaling-up and scaling-down, in line 
with the requirements of the OEMs. 
Fourth, the rapid expansion of GPNs is subject to extreme risks and uncertainty. This 
reflects the much greater volatility of international operations compared to domestic ones. 
Managing GPNs thus requires major efforts, in terms of management time and resources, which of 
course conflicts with the need to keep overheads at very low levels. 
Take as an example Jabil’s assessment of the risks involved in its international operations: 
In its 10K report for 2001 (p.50), the company emphasizes the following risks: “difficulties in 
staffing and managing foreign operations; political and economic instability; unexpected changes 
in regulatory requirements and laws; longer customer payment cycles and difficulty collecting 
accounts, receivable export duties, import controls and trade barriers (including quotas); 
government restrictions on the transfer of funds to us from our operations outside the United 
States; burdens of complying with a wide variety of foreign laws and labor practices; fluctuations 
in currency exchange rates, which could affect local payroll, utility and other expenses; inability 
to utilize net operating losses incurred by our foreign operations to reduce our US income taxes; 
…(and, especially in lower-cost locations) …” currency volatility, negative growth, high inflation, 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
18 This section is based on: a recent study by Booz-Allen & Hamilton (Lakenan et al, 2001); email coorespondence 
with the study’s lead author, Bill Lakenan; recent 10K reports of the leading US global CMs; and author’s interviews 
at affiliates of global CMs in Malaysia.   20
limited availability of foreign exchange”. The latter risks are particularly prominent in Asia, 
outside of Japan. 
Fifth, rapid growth, based on the use of stock as a currency for mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) is extremely risky, and contains the seed of future problems. It stretches the already 
limited financial resources of CMs, which typically have to cope with very low margins. The 
downturn of the global electronics industry has further increased these financial pressures on 
leading US-based CMs
19. This of course raises the question whether this will lead to off-balance 
sheet financing techniques to hide accumulated debt. 
Sixth, in contrast to the original expectation that outsourcing based on contract 
manufacturing may improve inventory and capacity planning, global brand leaders in the 
electronics industry, that rely heavily on outsourcing, have experienced very serious periodic 
mismatches between supply and demand. When a product unexpectedly becomes a hit, 
outsourcing provides these OEMs only with a limited capacity for scaling-up. During a recession, 
on the other hand, OEMs cannot abruptly reduce orders that they had previously placed with 
CMs
20. 
Lastly, there seems to be a conflict of interests between OEMs, who are looking for 
flexibility, and CMs, who are looking for predictability and scale. For instance, OEMs focus on 
early market penetration and rapid growth of market share to sustain comfortable margins. OEMs 
thus need flexibility in outsourcing arrangements that allows them to divert resources at short 
                                                           
19 Ironically, these pressures are particularly severe for those CMs, like Solectron, that have aggressively diversified 
beyond the PC sector into telecommunications and networking equipment, the high-growth sectors of the “New 
Economy” boom. 
20 Take Cisco. During the peak of the “New Economy” boom, from 1999 to 2000, demand for its products grew by 
50%. Reliance on CMs produced severe component shortages and a massive backlog in customer orders. When 
demand fell abruptly, starting from the fall of 2000, Cisco found itself saddled with excess capacity of $ 2.25bn that it 
had put in place to meet expected demand growth. Excess capacity of this magnitude is deadly in time-sensitive 
industries like electronics.   21
notice to a given product as it becomes a hit. This sharply contrasts with the situation of CMs: 
with razor-thin margins, they need to focus ruthlessly on cost cutting. CMs need predictability: 
“they want to make commitments in advance to reap benefits like big-lot purchases and decreased 
overtime.” (Lakenan et al , 2001, p.10). 
These conflicting interests complicate the coordination of CM-based outsourcing 
arrangements. They also require substantial fundamental changes in the organization of both 
OEMs and CMs, as well as an alignment of incentives through contract terms and agreements. 
Effective outsourcing requires that both flagships and CMs acknowledge their conflicting 
interests. Further, with complexity comes uncertainty. In industries with rapidly shifting 
technologies and markets, OEMs have no way to predict with any accuracy the specifications of 
what they will need, in terms of capacity, design features and configuration, and in terms of the 
specific mix of performance requirements. In the electronics industry, all of these variables can 
change quite drastically and at short notice.  
 
Table 2 Changes in CM-based Outsourcing Arrangements 
 
Such high uncertainty has important implications for the reorganization of CM-based 
outsourcing arrangements (table 2). Flexibility now becomes the key to success. Proceeding by 
conjecture (“stochastically”) takes over from a deterministic approach. Flagships need adjustable 
networks to ”satisfy a range of possible demand profiles with a portfolio of customizable 
capacity.” They “need access to - and the ability to turn off - big chunks of production more 
quickly than ever contemplated in order to capture profitability.”(Lakenan et al, 2001, pages 11, 
12). This has important implications for East Asia’s upgrading perspectives. As we will see in   22
section 5., the transition to stochastic and fluid-outsourcing arrangements will substantially 
increase the required capabilities that local network suppliers in East Asia will have to master. We 
will show however that this also opens up new upgrading possibilities, provided necessary 
changes in policies and support institutions are put in place.  
3. Coordination and Contents: Information Systems and Services 
  A second important transformation of GPNs results from the increasing use of digital 
information systems to manage these networks (coordination), and to build “global information 
service networks” (GISN) that complement networks centered on manufacturing (contents). 
  3.1. Digital Information Systems and Knowledge Diffusion 
Digital information systems (DIS) - electronic systems that integrate software and 
hardware to enable communication and collaborative work - are increasingly used to manage 
GPNs. While still at an early stage of “trial-and-error”, these systems appear to enhance gradually 
the scope for knowledge sharing among multiple network participants at distant locations. Equally 
important, they will reduce (but not eliminate) the problems of rapid coordination of product 
design and manufacture over long distance
21. This new mobility of knowledge arguably may 
provide new opportunities for Asian suppliers to upgrade their capabilities, provided appropriate 
policies and support institutions are in place. 
DIS provide new opportunities for improving communication routines within GPN: new 
combinations become feasible between old and new forms of communication. The most 
commonly used technologies today facilitate asynchronous interaction, such as e-mail or non-real 
time database sharing. But as data transfer capacity (“bandwidth”) increases, this is creating new 
                                                           
21 I am grateful to Keith Pavitt for this suggestion.   23
opportunities for using technologies that facilitate synchronous interaction. This involves video-
conferencing and real-time data exchange for financial control, engineering, and R&D. 
The digitization of knowledge implies that it can be delivered as a service and built around 
open standards. This has fostered the specialization of knowledge creation, giving rise to a process 
of modularization, very much like earlier modularization processes in hardware manufacturing. 
Under the heading of “e-business”, a new generation of networking software provides a greater 
variety of tools for representing knowledge, including low-cost audio-visual representations. 
Those programs also provide flexible information systems that support not only information 
exchange among dispersed network nodes, but also the sharing, utilization, and creation of 
knowledge among multiple network participants at remote locations. New forms of remote control 
are emerging for manufacturing processes, quality, supply chains, and customer relations.  
DIS, and especially the open-ended structure of the Internet substantially broadens the 
scope for outsourcing. It has allowed OEMs to shift from partial outsourcing, covering the nuts 
and bolts of manufacturing, to systemic outsourcing that includes knowledge-intensive support 
services. This has intensified the competition among the providers of CM services: competition 
now focuses on the capacity to provide integrated manufacturing, design and supply chain 
management services wherever required.  
In turn, this has intensified the competition among specialized clusters in the electronics 
industry. For lower-cost outsourcing, OEMs and CMs can now choose between alternative 
locations in Asia, Latin America, the former Soviet bloc, and the European periphery. For higher-
end outsourcing, they can choose between specialized clusters in Nordic countries, the US, France 
and Germany, as well as in Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, Shanghai, Israel, Ireland, and Hungary.   24
3.2. Global Information Service Networks
22 
Global information services networks (GISNs) complement the existing production 
networks (GPN) with their primary focus on manufacturing. GISNs cover a variety of knowledge 
support services, such as software engineering and development, IT applications development, 
business process outsourcing, maintenance and support of information systems, as well as skill 
transfer and training. While much of this service outsourcing involves low-cost “sweatshop” 
activities
23, it also provides considerable opportunities for Asian network suppliers to upgrade 
their capabilities. 
a. Market pull 
The growth of these service networks in Asia’s electronics industry is due to a combination 
of market pull and government policies. With the drastic slow-down in major IT markets, 
especially in the US, the center of activity has shifted to Asia. During 2001, the region`s 
information services market outpaced other regions significantly, with a growth rate double the 
world average, and nearly three times that of North America (Gartner Dataquest data, quoted in 
CMPnet.Asia, December 4, 2001). The main drivers of demand are attempts by both global 
flagships and local suppliers to improve the efficiency and security of existing GPNs. Asian lead 
markets are Singapore; Korea; Taiwan; major export platform clusters in Malaysia and elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia; China´s electronics clusters, especially in the South, and Shanghai; as well as 
India`s software clusters.  
b. Government policies 
                                                           
22 Based on phone interviews, company websites and the following sources: various issues, during 2001, of 
CMPnet.asia and Asia Computer Weekly.com; Aberdeen Group, 2001. 
23 A typical recent example is a call center set up by General Electric in the city of Dalian (Liaoning Province). 
Staffed by Chinese people fluent in Japanese, the center handles inquiries from GE Consumer Credit`s Japanese 
customers (The Nikkei Weekly, November 12, 2001).   25
A second important driver of GISN are support policies and incentives to foster the 
establishment of higher-level software and service development centres, especially in Singapore, 
China, Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. Singapore, for instance, has amended its highly successful 
policy to develop local manufacturing support industries (especially for the electronics industry) 
with a policy to promote local information service suppliers. While the former policy is called 
“Local Industry Upgrading Programme” (LIUP), the new service-oriented programme is called 
“Infocomm Local Industry Upgrading Programme” (iLIUP). A typical example are the iLIUP 
partnership agreements that link Software AG, the German vendor of XML  (=extensible markup 
languge) software, with specialized Singaporean solution providers
24 to develop customized 
XML-based business solutions for foreign affiliates and Asian companies. To make this network 
work, Software AG has brought in a global supplier of training programs for XML and related 
technologies, called Genovate Solutions. The latter company is responsible for establishing and 
running an XML Academy in Singapore that serves the Asia-Pacific region, training enterprises 
and individuals on XML, SAP, Java, Oracle, Linux, Web Logic and other enterprise software 
programs. 
Of particular interest are policies, pursued in China, to develop software and information 
service capabilities. A core element of these policies is the development of ten major software 
bases. Three important examples include the Yangtze River Software Belt, the Qilu Software Park 
in Jinan/Shandong Province, and Shanghai`s Pudong Software Park. Most of these projects are 
quite ambitious. For instance, the Jiangsu Software Park, the center of the Yangtze River Software 
Belt takes up 120,000 sq.m. and contains 165 software companies that focus on applications in 
telecommunications, network security, and e-business. This Park is expected to become a major 
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export platform for software, way beyond the current software export revenues of Jiangsu 
province of Yuan 2.3bn (about 277 $), one tenth of China`s total software exports. 
The Qilu Software Park in Jinan/Shandong Province is expected to develop into China´s 
largest software park. The park covers a vast area of 6.5 sq.km, and sales revenues (mostly 
exports) are expected to reach $ 1.2bn in 2005, up from sales revenues of $ 233million in 2000. A 
very different approach has been chosen for Shanghai`s Pudong Software Park. Space constraints  
(only 9000 sq.m. are available for this park) and the high price of land have led to a very selective 
focus on the dominant global flagships in the information industry. The dominant flagship there is 
IBM, which is responsible for roughly one third ($ 300 million) of total current investment in the 
Pudong Park by foreign corporations. The Park’s specialization is shaped by two important recent 
developments. First, Shanghai is rapidly developing into a regional R&D and engineering center 
for leading global network flagships (so far around 40), especially in the electronics industry. 
Second, Shanghai is about to become one of Asia’s most important clusters for the design and 
manufacturing of semiconductors. The Pudong Microelectronic Industrial Belt aims to build 
around 10 chip production lines by 2005, with a projected production value of yuan 100 billion 
(ca. $ 12.05 billion). Proximity to this cluster implies that much of the Pudong Software Park’ 
activities are geared to circuit design and related activities. 
Another example of joint cross-border software development is a new research center, 
established by Ericcson, the Swedish telecommunications equipment producer, in China´s 
Southern Software park in Zhuhai, China. That center serves as a focal point for interaction with 
Ericcson`s local partners, enabling them to co-develop and test 2G, 2.5G, and 3G applications for 
the Chinese market. The center is jointly run with Zhongshan University of Guangzhou province 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
security, network knowledge management and a variety of Internet-based application services.   27
that provides top-notch graduates to pursue joint research projects with Ericcson related to 
wireless IP data network compression and encryption technology, multimedia services, mobile 
electronics business, bluetooth technology, embedded software, and 3G systems. 
c. Skill development and training 
Skill development and training are an essential element of these GISN. This may open up 
new opportunities for industrial upgrading. Often training and service provision are closely 
intertwined. A first example is the development of Asian networks for wireless Java applications. 
This is based on the joint initiative of two global flagships: Sun Microsystems, the developer of 
the Java operating system, and Nokia, the leading supplier of mobile handsets. This initiative 
brings together the individual GISNs, established by both flagships: the Sun Developer network 
and the Forum Nokia. The Asia-Pacific Sun-Nokia Wireless Java Developers networks have a 
twofold purpose: to develop the Asian market for wireless Java applications, and, at the same 
time, to create an Asian low-cost base of developers of such systems. A key component of these 
networks is the Developer Training Program that is based on tools, knowledge and resources 
provided by the two network flagships. While programs and Java tools will be available at no 
charge to Asian developers, they will be charged for hardware, training and technical support. The 
objective is to “train up to 30,000 (Asian) developers to develop wireless Java applications … and 
to bring to market 1000 Java content providers by end-2002” (AMPnet.asia, November 29, 2001). 
For Nokia, the objective is to create an Asian consumer market for over 50 million mobile 
terminals supporting the Java platform. 
A second example of emerging GISNs involves the skill transfer and the outsourcing of 
support services for storage area networks (SAN), a technology where Asian markets are expected 
to play an important role. With the exception of Singapore, Asia economies are latecomers in the   28
use of digital information systems (DIS). Asian companies and government agencies thus have the 
opportunity to base their storage infrastructure on the new SAN model that is more flexible and 
cheaper than traditional direct-attached storage models. In response, all major providers of 
infrastructure for SAN are rushing to establish GISNs that, in addition to providing training for 
potential users, seek to develop a robust supply base for software development and SAN-related 
support services. An example is the emerging network of Brocade Communications Systems that 
has nodes in Hong Kong, Seoul, Singapore, Sydney, Tokyo and Beijing. An essential element of 
Brocade`s network are partnerships with leading Asian universities, like Beijing`s Tsinghua 
University, to establish joint technology labs and scholarship programs. 
3Com Asia-Pacific, the network equipment and software supplier provides a third example 
of GISN that are centered on IT-enabled training (so-called “e-training”). Its 3Com University 
network provides online training and certification programmes in simplified Chinese, as well as 
web-based support services to customers and suppliers in 11 major cities in China. 3Com also has 
established similar networks in Japan and Korea, and plans to expand into other Asian countries. 
An important motivation is the need to create new markets for 3Com’s products and software. 
Equally important however appears to be that 3Com needs to have access to lower-cost local 
supply bases for service modules. 
Our last example concerns Sybase, a global vendor of database technology and e-business 
applications. The company has strong links with Korea and China. In Korea, its has partnered with 
Samsung to create new e-business software designed to facilitate the management of Asian 
suppliers` multiple linkages with GPNs. In China, Sybase has developed strong links with leading 
telecommunications carriers, supplying data base management software to support the billing   29
systems for these carriers
25. Sybase’s entry into the e-training market is motivated by two 
concerns: to develop the Chinese market for data base management software, and to reduce the 
growing IT skills deficit in this country. An equally important objective is the development of a 
robust low-cost human resource base that Sybase can tap into at a later stage. A major component 
of this training network is a joint venture between Sybase and the Beijing University of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics (BUAA) to offer IT training courses online that are customized to 
the requirements of specific industries. Topics covered include database technology, e-business 
applications, Java development, and mobile and wireless applications.  
 
4.  China: A Shift in Network Location 
A third important transformation within East Asia is the emergence of China as a priority 
investment target for the leading global electronics flagships (whether from the US, Japan or 
Europe), their global suppliers from Korea and Taiwan, and, more recently, the leading U.S. 
contract manufacturers. As a result, China poses a serious challenge for mid-size countries (like 
Malaysia) with a focus on volume manufacturing.  But the new challenge from China  could also 
be a “blessing in disguise”, catalyzing for serious IU efforts. Furthermore, China’s huge potential 
market for electronic products and services provides new trade and investment opportunities for 
Asian firms. Equally important, Asian electronics firms may consider to tap into China’s huge 
pool of low-cost engineers and scientists. 
4.1. China Fever- What is Real? 
There is of course a tendency to exaggerate the China factor. From Southeast Asia to 
Korea and Taiwan, from Mexico and Brazil to Germany and Spain, a perceived threat from China 
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rather than internal, homemade problems are at the center of public debates. Widespread claims 
that China in a short while will be an economic superpower and a major player in the electronics 
industry, should be treated with a grain of skepticism (e.g. Dahlman and Aubert, 2001). The same 
goes for the perceived diversion of FDI away from Southeast Asia to China. During 2001, four of 
ASEAN’s ten economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) are estimated to 
have received more than five times the net FDI from the US than China (U.S. Department of 
Commerce data, quoted in” Asian Economic Survey - A Special report, Asian Wall Street Journal, 
October 29, 2001). Most of the reported $ 40 bn FDI inflows come from Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
and a substantial part is “round-tripping” domestic investment disguised as FDI (Credit Suisse 
First Boston data, quoted in the Financial Times, August 14, 2001). 
4.2. China´s New Role in the Electronics Industry 
Despite these caveats, there is no doubt that in the electronics industry, the center of 
gravity of FDI is beginning to move toward China, transforming the geography of GPNs within 
the region. China is no longer only a cheap labor location. China’s new attractiveness results from 
a combination of five developments: a booming market for IT products and services, when the rest 
of the world is in recession; China’s unlimited supply of low-cost IT skills; abundant land and a 
rapidly improving infrastructure; a massive rush of capital flows into China; and, catching this 
opportunity, support policies pursued by the central government, as well as regional and local 
authorities to rely on FDI as an accelerator of industrial upgrading
26. 
The move toward China is particularly pronounced in three sectors: electronic components 
(especially semiconductors), computers, and telecommunications. For US FDI in semiconductors, 
China has become the second most important recipient, after Singapore, overtaking Malaysia, 
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which was the main recipient in 1996. Even the new incentives provided by the Malaysia’s IMP2 
did not prevent this move toward China. A similar trend can be discerned for FDI by Japanese 
electronics firms: China has moved into first place ahead of Malaysia, which was its biggest 
recipient during the early 1990s (Malaysia Ministry of Finance data, quoted in Takeuchi, 2001). 
Taiwanese computer companies that supply leading US computer OEM have played an 
important pioneering role in integrating China into GPNs. Since the early 1990s, they have 
continuously moved production from Taiwan to China. The result is that roughly 40% of China’s 
electronics exports today are shipped from Taiwanese factories in China (courtesy of Market 
Intelligence Center, Institute for Information industry, Taipei, December 2001). Taiwanese 
suppliers now need to serve a large share, around 33.2%, of their export orders from overseas 
production lines in China. 
From the US, OEMs like Motorola, Intel, AMD, HP, Compaq, Microsoft, Cisco, and Sun 
Microsystems have all initiated significant new investment projects in China. Motorola for 
instance considers China to be of critical importance. “Our main driver of growth is China”, 
according to the company`s newly appointed Asia pacific president (Asia Wall Street Journal, 
November 20, 2001). At present, Motorola has 12 affiliates in the Asia-Pacific region. While the 
company´s involvement started out with Korea, later followed by Taiwan and Singapore, China 
has gained substantially in importance since the early 1990s. Currently, six of Motorola`s Asian 
affiliates are based in China, with two in Singapore, including the regional headquarters, and one 
each in Korea, Taiwan, India and Thailand. Motorola counts on continuous rapid growth of the 
China market to reduce the negative impact of the current recession. In 2000, China accounted for 
12% of Motorola`s global sales, generating $ 4.5 billion of revenue. 
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   But China is also expected to play an important role for Motorola’s long-term strategy. By 
providing access to the world`s largest pool of relatively lower-cost IT skills, the company expects 
to enhance its innovation capabilities. For instance, out of the 13,000 people that Motorola 
currently employs in China, 1,000, i.e. almost 8% are active in R&D. Reflecting China´s growing 
importance, Motorola has held its annual board meeting for 2001 in China, its first board meeting 
outside the US. During that meeting, Motorola`s chairman also met China´s president, and 
announced that the company planned to double its China investment from $ 5 bn in 2001 to $ 
10bn in 2005. 
  China also has attracted major new investments from leading European electronics 
flagships, like Philips, Nokia, Siemens, Alcatel and Ericsson. Philips for instance has moved its 
entire cell phone manufacturing operations to its Shenzhen joint venture with Beijing-based China 
Electronics Corp. And Nokia has committed itself to establish a large integrated cluster, the 
Xingwang (International Industrial Park) in Beijing which incorporates Nokia´s own mobile 
phone plant and that brings together 15 of its long-standing and trusted international component 
suppliers. This Nokia-centered cluster involves an initial investment of about $ 1.2 billion and is 
expected to create 15,000 jobs, with a projected annual sales volume of $ 6 billion.  
  In addition, all leading Japanese electronics flagships are considering major new 
investments in China, as they struggle under a depressed domestic economy and high 
manufacturing costs. Toshiba is building a plant for computer hardware and components in 
Nanjing, while Mitsubishi Electric, Matsushita and NEC all are expanding their phone production 
in China. Finally, a large surge in China investments is also reported by the Korean electronics 
chaebol that are all gripped by a severe “China fever”.   33
4.3. Semiconductors
27 
Since 2000, the semiconductor (SC) industry provides a telling example of the speed of 
China’s integration into GPNs. In terms of policies and support institutions, China’s experience in 
the SC industry also provides a useful reference point for our case study of Malaysia. 
Until 1999, investment in China´s SC industry lacked woefully behind similar investments 
in Korea and Taiwan. The turning point came in 2000. During that year, the Chinese government 
apparently made a strategic decision to rely on FDI to accelerate the development of this industry. 
The underlying expectation is that FDI can generate a critical mass, establishing new global 
dynamic clusters for SC manufacturing, primarily in Shanghai and Beijing. The hope is that, if this 
strategy succeeds to engage leading US flagships (both SC manufacturers and equipment 
producers), this may provide enough pressure within the US to dismantle the remaining US 
technology export restrictions. This may be an unrealistic expectation however, in light of the 
current resurgence of defense and security concerns in the US
28. 
China’s new pragmatic policies toward FDI have induced global flagships to announce 
several large investment projects worth around $ 7 billion. During 2000, China’s SC output grew 
by 42%. Exports during 2000 grew by almost 35% in unit terms, and 30% in value terms, to $ 2.1 
billion. The role of GPNs has been critical: Foreign-invested enterprises dominate China’s SC 
exports, with a share of about 94%, with state-owned enterprises only responsible for a meager 
5.3%.  
                                                           
27 If not stated otherwise, the following is based on Simon, 2001, and phone interviews with leading US 
semiconductor vendors. 
28 By late December 2001, the US administration was in fact considering imposing new controls on the export of 
high-performance US-made computers, out of fear that these technologies “could help adversaries in intelligence-
gathering or the design of advanced weaponry.“ Such policies would reverse a campaign pledge by President Bush, 
who then argued that such export control policies were “arbitrary and irrational”. They also fly in the face of the 
findings of a major Pentagon study, published in late 1999 which concluded that “it is no longer feasible to control 
high performance computer hardware.” Financial Times, December 30, 2001.   34
During 2001, China has emerged as the main growth market for SC production equipment 
manufacturers. This of course reflects the worldwide downturn of new investment in SC 
manufacturing capacity. Leading equipment makers are all scrambling to expand their sales in the 
thus far largely untapped China market
29. Table 3 presents information on major investment 
projects by global flagships; Taiwanese contract manufacturers (“silicon foundries”), as well as 
domestic firms.  
 
Table 3: Major Investment Projects in China`s Semiconductor Industry, since January 2000 
 
The prospective boost in FDI has given rise to highly optimistic projections. In-Stat Group, 
a SC industry-consulting firm, argues that China has the potential to become the third-largest SC 
producer after the US and Japan by 2003, and the second-largest SC market after the US by 2005. 
The Chinese government certainly leaves no doubt that it has very ambitious objectives. By 2005, 
it hopes to increase SC sales revenues to $9.7 billion, or 2% of the global market. By then, 
domestic production is expected to meet about 30% of China’s demand. By 2010, China expects 
to be where Korea is now, i.e. producing roughly 5% of the global SC market. 
If these projections would materialize, this obviously would pose a major threat for 
existing SC industries in Asia. This threat would be most immediate for Malaysia, with its heavy 
reliance on SC assembly. However, important threats may also emerge for semiconductor 
manufacturing in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, as well as in Japan. But it is unlikely that these 
countries will simply sit still and let shifting comparative advantage run its course. In fact, all 
major competitors in the global SC industry are currently pursuing aggressive policies to upgrade 
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their product composition and capabilities, giving rise to a major transformation of this industry 
(e.g., Macher, Mowery, Simcoe, 2002). 
In addition, it will not be easy for China to realize its ambitious upgrading objectives. One 
reason is the still relatively low level of development of China`s semiconductor industry.  An 
important indicator of is the fundamental mismatch between China’s exports and imports of SCs. 
In value terms, China imports over 70% of all SC devices that it needs. This is slightly better than 
the ratio found in Korea´s semiconductor industry during the early 1990s (Ernst, 1994b and 1998). 
Most Chinese exports are lower-end devices involving fairly mature and basic process and 
manufacturing techniques. Imports, on the other hand, are much more sophisticated. Between 
1995 and 2000, China´s SC imports grew at a compound annual rate of almost 92%, while exports 
over the same period rose by less than 60%. 
A further fundamental constraint to a rapid upgrading of China’s SC industry are the 
massive investments in production equipment, facilities, infrastructure, R&D, and education and 
training. The projected expansion of international market share requires an upgrading in the 
product mix as well as in process and design capabilities. Out of China`s 25 wafer fab lines in 
early 2001, only one used 8-inch wafers, while 21 lines used outdated 5-inch wafers (6 lines) and 
even 4-inch wafers (15 lines)
30. 
Table 4 provides a widely used proxy, developed by the U.S. Semiconductor Industry 
Association (SIA), for the investment costs of wafer fabrication. It is important to emphasize that 
these estimates assume that sophisticated infrastructure and support industries exist within the 
relevant clusters, or at least in close proximity. This is by no means the case in China. For 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
China from $ 100 million in 2000 to $ 1 billion by 2005 (Far Eastern Economic Review, Cover Story, November 1, 
2001). 
30 China Electronics News, March 27, 2001. The 8inch line is a JV with Japan`s NEC, the Shanghai Hua Hong NEC 
Electronics Co.   36
instance, 90% of the materials used in the production of 8inch wafer fab lines must be imported. 
And domestic manufacturers of SC production equipment meet less than 10% of domestic 
requirements. In other words, China`s weak SC infrastructure and support industry base clearly 
implies that the effective investment costs for upgrading its SC industry may be substantially 
higher than indicated by the SIA figures. 
 
Table 4 The Cost of Upgrading: Investment Costs of Wafer Fabrication 
 
  In short, there are clear indications in the semiconductor industry of a shift in network 
location away from the traditional export platform sites in Southeast Asia to China. Yet, this 
process may not be as quick and smooth as many observers appear to believe. This may provide 
enough breathing space for those countries that are most heavily exposed to the threat from China.  
 
5. Implications for Malaysia’s Upgrading Perspectives in the Electronics Industry 
Let us now return to our initial question: In light of the afore-mentioned three 
transformations of GPNs in East Asia’s electronics industry, what can we say about Malaysia’s 
upgrading perspectives? Do these transformations provide new opportunities for relieving 
domestic upgrading constraints? And what policies and support institutions could help to 
successfully implement upgrading strategies?  
We first highlight achievements and structural weaknesses of the Malaysian electronics 
industry that define and constrain its upgrading perspectives (5.1 and 5.2). We then assess current 
policies that try to link cluster development and global network integration (5.3), discuss 
adjustments in linkages with global brand leaders (OEMs) (5.4), and ask to what degree linkages   37
with contract manufacturers (CMs) can broaden these opportunities (5.5). We conclude, by 
exploring new opportunities for diversifying Malaysia’s international linkages that could enhance 
the upgrading prospects of its electronics firms, focusing on carriers of knowledge exchange that 
play an important complementary role to formal GPNs (5.6). 
5.1. Achievements 
  A progressive integration into GPNs has been a primary driver of Malaysia´s success in the 
electronics industry. This integration started in the early 1970s with offshore chip assembly, 
primarily by US semiconductor firms. The next stage, since the early 1980s, was centered on 
Japanese electronics makers that moved their export platform production for consumer electronics 
to Malaysia and other Southeast Asian locations. Since the late 1980s, Malaysia was integrated 
into the production networks of American producers of computer-related equipment, as well as 
those established by their Taiwanese subcontractors. The most recent stage involves the 
production of communication and networking equipment, and the acquisition of existing flagship 
affiliates by global contract manufacturers (CM).  
  The Malaysian government, through its Industrial Master Plan (1986-1995), tried to reap 
as many benefits as possible from this fortuitous tailwind of foreign direct investment 
(FDI)(Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1986
31). The guiding principle has been 
“outward industrialization”, subordinated to the needs of global network flagships. The results 
have been impressive, in terms of production, exports, employment and investment (table 5) 
 
Table 5: Electronics Industry: Performance Compared to Objectives of Industrial Master 
Plan 
                                                           
31 Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1986, Industrial Master Plan 1986-95, Kuala Lumpur.   38
 
  Within a relatively short period, Malaysia experienced a substantial capacity and 
international market share expansion for electronics products. A heavy reliance on electronics 
exports has acted as a powerful engine of growth. While there were periodic disruptions, like the 
downturn in 1985/86, and in particular the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98, the overall balance is 
remarkably positive. During the last decade, from 1990 to 2000, Malaysia`s electronics industry 
registered a CAAGR of 23.5%. During the same period, exports grew at an annual average of 
25.2%, while employment grew almost 11% annually (figures courtesy of Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, Kuala Lumpur, June 2001). 
Global electronics brand leaders, and more recently, their contract manufacturers, played 
an important role. The electronics industry is the major recipient of FDI, absorbing more than one 
third of total manufacturing FDI between 1996-98 (MIDA, 1999). Around 100 large foreign 
affiliates effectively dominate this industry. Their share in manufactured exports (most of it 
electronics), has increased sharply from 39.8% in 1985 to 68.3% in 1992 (Takeuchi, 1997: p.9). 
The 18 members of the Malaysian-American Electronic Industry (MAEI) association accounted 
for more than 14 % of Malaysia`s electronics exports during 2001 (Business Times, Kuala 
Lumpur, October 3, 2001).  
5.2. Weaknesses 
Yet, despite these achievements, a shift in strategy is now overdue. Since the summer of 2000, the 
downturn in the global electronics industry has brutally exposed six structural weaknesses of 
Malaysia`s electronics industry that define and constrain its upgrading perspectives: an 
asymmetric industry structure; a heavy import dependence, due to weak domestic support 
industries and limited Hirschman-type linkages; a heavy reliance on exports, especially to the US   39
market; a highly concentrated product composition, centered on low-end assembly operations; a 
declining capacity to generate employment; and a serious mismatch between the demand and 
supply for skills.  While “outward industrialization” policies have provided Malaysia with 
substantial initial advantages in terms of export and capacity growth, these policies failed to 
develop sufficient sectoral breadth and depth. 
a. Asymmetric industry structure 
Malaysia’s integration into GPN gave rise to the development of an asymmetric industry 
structure:  multiple layers of electronics firms are distinguished by asymmetric control over 
resources and decision-making. At the end of 2000, roughly 900 electronics companies were 
registered in Malaysia employing more than 400,000 workers. While Malaysian firms dominate in 
numbers, Malaysia`s electronics industry continues to be shaped by strategic decisions of global 
flagships (both OEMs and major American CMs). In hierarchical order, four types of firms can be 
distinguished: at the top of the industry pyramid are global OEMs and CMs; followed by suppliers 
and contract manufacturers from Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, and Korea; higher-tier local suppliers; 
and, at the bottom, lower-tier local suppliers. 
In contrast to countries like Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, Malaysia has failed to 
develop a broad and multi-tier base of support industries. There are of course a few widely quoted 
success cases, almost all of them located in Penang, such as BCM, Globetronics, Unico, LKT, and 
Eng Teknologi, that have successfully positioned themselves as higher-tier local suppliers for 
leading OEMs (Rasiah, 2002; Best, 2001). As we will see later, these companies are currently 
moving to upgrade their capabilities to cope with the new opportunities and challenges that result 
from the transformations of GPNs.    40
However, the majority of the local suppliers possesses few proprietary advantages, and 
clearly qualifies as “lower-tier” suppliers. They lack sufficient financial resources to invest in 
training (and re-training), and to invest in digital information systems and leading-edge 
equipment. This is so, despite various promotion policies, focused on the smaller suppliers, 
introduced by the government. Possible explanations may include the proximity to Singapore and 
its sophisticated local supplier base, which may discourage flagships from using Malaysian 
suppliers; and negative side effects of Malaysia’s “New Economic Policy”. 
This asymmetric industry structure has given rise to a lack of efficient domestic linkages 
and an inverted production pyramid -- a huge and rapidly growing final product sector that rests 
on a weak and much smaller domestic base of support industries.  
b. Import dependence 
The result is persistently high import dependence: rapid growth in the final products sector 
necessitates considerable imports of intermediates and production equipment. Between 1986 and 
1992, imports of Malaysia’s electronics industry increased at a rate of more than 24%, far 
exceeding the goal of 7.6% envisioned under the IMP. By the late 1980s, the Malaysian 
electronics industry had to import almost 43% of the intermediate goods that were required for the 
production of one unit of final output, far more than Korea (37%) and Japan (8.2%) (Takeuchi, 
1997:7). This of course was a reflection of the initial strategy to position Malaysia as a low labor 
cost assembly site. By the late 1980s, however, the government acknowledged that this strategy 
was no longer sustainable, as new lower labor cost locations emerged within Southeast Asia, as 
well as in China, and Mexico. 
Yet, Malaysia´s dependence on imports of electronics components, and especially 
semiconductors kept increasing during the 1990s, both as a share of electronics imports, and as a   41
share of total merchandise imports (table 6). This suggests a fundamental mismatch of the 
country´s electronics exports and imports, with negative terms-of-trade implications: while 
imports involve high value-added core components, especially microprocessors and other ICs, 
Malaysia’s component exports overwhelmingly consist of low-value added final assemblies. 
 
Table 6  Dependence on Input Imports 
 
c. Export dependence 
   Malaysia`s electronics industry remains heavily dependent on exports: in 2000, electronics 
manufacturing made up about 60% of Malaysia`s total export value, of which 35-40% were 
exports from Penang. Malaysia is one of the eight countries that are most dependent on exports to 
the US, six of these being from East Asia: its exports to the US (most of them electronics 
products) account for 24% of its GDP in 1999. This implies an extreme vulnerability of 
Malaysia’s electronics industry to a recession in major export markets, especially the US. During 
2001, when the U.S. electronics market was in free fall, Malaysia’s electronics production and 
exports dramatically declined, the former by more than 25%, and exports by almost 19%. 
 
d. Concentrated product composition 
A highly concentrated product composition adds further to the country`s vulnerability. The 
share of electronics in merchandise exports has increased from 47.6% (1993) to almost 58% in 
1998. And components account for 46% of all electronics exports, of which semiconductors alone 
account for more than one-third. (table 7). Industrial electronics (including computer-related   42
products and telecom equipment) account for slightly more than 30%, and consumer electronics 
for about 15%.  
 
Table 7 Developing Asia’s Trade Specialization Profiles: RCA and Leading Exports 
Products 
 
In historical terms, this constitutes an important improvement. Back in 1986, 84% of 
Malaysia`s electronics exports were components (most of them assembled chips), with 14% 
consisting of CE, and a measly 2% for industrial electronics. Unfortunately, this impressive 
change has not been sufficient to reduce the country´s vulnerability to abrupt changes in the world 
market. An important reason for this vulnerability is that SC exports generate very little local 
value-added, as Malaysia only performs assembly and testing. A heavy dependence on assembly-
type operations for a handful of products can be crippling, as those operations can be easily 
replicated in countries with low education levels.  
The government has tried to address this issue, by promoting investment in two new 
silicon foundries, Silterra (in Kulim High-Tech Park), and 1st Silicon, in Sarawak. To justify the 
heavy investment outlays, an attempt has been made to use these fabrication plants as catalysts for 
the development of circuit design houses. It is too early to assess  the success of these investments. 
Bad timing has been an important constraint - these facilities became operational during the 
downturn. However, there are also positive signs. As the provision of  silicon foundry services is 
becoming a commodity (Form 20-F report of United Microlectronics Corp. to the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, December 31, 2001, section on “risk factors”), there are now new 
entry possibilities for low-cost foundries in Malaysia and China, while the industry leaders (IBM   43
Microelectronics; and Taiwan’s TSMC and UMC) move up the ladder to combining design 
capabilities with advanced fabrication technology ( 300 mm wafers) (Depeyrot, 2002) 
e. Declining capacity for employment generation 
A capacity for job creation in Asia’s thriving electronics sector has been a hallmark of the 
region’s successful export-oriented industrialization. Since the 1997 financial crisis, however, the 
sector’s capacity for employment generation has declined. Take Seagate, the leading US. disk 
drive manufacturer. Since the mid-1980s, the company was among the largest employers in 
Southeast Asia - topping the list in Penang and Singapore. That golden age of employment 
generation has long gone. Table 8 documents the company’s massive destruction of manufacturing 
jobs in Asia. 
 
Table 8 Seagate: Shrinking Asian Manufacturing Employment 
  In Malaysia’s electronics industry, an estimated 150,000 to 165,000 jobs have been lost 
since the financial crisis (table 9). During 2001, the most recent year for which data are available, 
almost 19,000 workers have been laid off. Malaysian labor market experts talk of a declining 
employment-generating capacity of the electronics industry: while after earlier downturns, a 
substantial share of laid-off workers has been re-hired, this no longer seems to be the case.  
Table 9: Job Losses in Malaysia`s Electronics Industry, 1998 - 2001 
The latest unemployment report, prepared for the Penang State Government, conveys some 
distressing findings (Too and Leng, 2002). With job losses of more than 16,000 during 2001, most 
of them in sectors related to the electronics industry, retrenchment has been pretty dramatic, and it   44
hits primarily low-skilled, female production workers
32. Particularly disturbing is an unusually 
high proportion of the retrenched workers (62%) that could not be located, indicating a massive 
return of Malay females (in the 25-29 age range) to their villages. This shows that export-led 
electronics manufacturing is unlikely to act again as an engine of employment growth. 
f. Mismatch between the demand and supply for skills 
Finally, an increasingly important weakness in Malaysia’s electronics industry is a serious 
mismatch between the demand and supply for skills. Despite the recession, job vacancies have 
increased to nearly 90,000 nationwide (September 2001), with the biggest job openings in the 
“managerial and professional” categories in the electronics industry. Data collected in Penang 
show that a growing deficit of specialized IT skills is an important qualitative constraint to 
Malaysia’s upgrading perspectives in the electronics industry  (DCT, 2002). This is especially true 
for engineers with degrees in electronics, mechanical engineering, quality control, testing and 
chemistry. There are also important bottlenecks for mechanics, and tool-and-die-makers, and IT 
professionals, especially system analysts. All of this indicates weak incentives for firms to invest 
in long-term assets, such as specialized skills. 
This human resource bottleneck also has an important qualitative dimension. As Too and 
Leng (2002) document, having the right degrees in EEE, IT, and management does not guarantee 
entry into the labor market. They also find that the majority of unemployed graduates have not 
held a job of any kind since graduation. This reflects the perception of electronics firms that local 
university graduates have book knowledge, but are ill-equipped to deal with real world problems 
on the shop floor, and that they lack basic skills in communication, negotiation and presentation. 
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workers account for almost two-thirds of total job losses. 
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This has led to the emergence of a bifurcated labor market, where the winners pick all the stakes: 
there is intense competition for those engineers and managers who either graduated from overseas 
universities or who worked for a foreign firm. Obviously, upgrading efforts will remain truncated, 
as long as this skills mismatch will not be reduced. 
 
5.3. A Shift in Strategy (I): Clusters and Global Network Integration 
Two policy initiatives are important for assessing Malaysia’s upgrading perspectives in the 
electronics industry: the Second Industrial Master Plan (IMP2)
33 and the Multimedia Super 
Corridor (MSC) concept (Multimedia Development Corporation, 2002). Both represent attempts 
to overcome some of the afore-mentioned structural weaknesses of this sector. Both point in the 
right direction, but have had only limited success. In what follows, we will explore whether the 
transformations of GPNs that we have documented in this chapter, provide new opportunities for 
relieving domestic upgrading constraints. 
In section 5.3 to 5.5, we focus on attempts to link cluster formation with global network 
integration that were initiated by IMP2. Finally, in section 5.6, we will address related attempts to 
strengthen innovative capabilities in Malaysia that were initiated by the MSC concept, and ask 
what new opportunities have emerged for diversifying international knowledge linkages.   
a) The Second Industrial Master Plan (IMP2) 
The IMP2 document signals a fundamental change in Malaysia’s industrialization strategy, 
away from assembly-based “outward industrialization” to value chain-based manufacturing, from 
sector-based to cluster-based development, and from performance targets to productivity-driven 
growth. The strategy is defined by two key concepts: “manufacturing ++” and “cluster-based 
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development”. In line with Porter (1990), “manufacturing ++” highlights activities at both ends of 
the value chain, i.e. R&D and engineering, and in-bound logistics on the one hand, and outbound-
logistics and sales & marketing, on the other hand. It is argued that a move into knowledge-
intensive support services like product development, process engineering, supply chain 
management, and some select areas of R&D will enhance local value-added and productivity. 
“Cluster-based development” implies that, based on existing strengths especially in components 
and semiconductors, developing a dense web of domestic linkages will enhance value -added and 
deepen domestic capabilities. 
On paper, these two concepts represent the cutting-edge in current policy debates on 
regional and technology policy (e.g., OECD, 1999 and Best, 2001). It is important however to 
emphasize that, within Malaysia, there are four different “electronics clusters”
34 that differ quite 
substantially in their upgrading objectives and capabilities: i) in the North, the Penang Island and 
the Kulim HiTech park in the neighboring state of Kedah; ii) in the Center, Selangor and Negeri 
Sembilan; iii) the southern part around Johor, with close linkages with Singapore; and iv) the 
more recent MSC around Kuala Lumpur. Of these, the combined Penang/Kedah cluster has 
arguably been the most successful one, with good chances for further upgrading. 
IMP2 highlights four specific objectives: i) foster the growth of “leading local companies 
(Malaysian brands); ii) reduce dependence on input imports; iii) strengthen agglomeration 
economies by developing “Integrated Manufacturing Centers” (IMC) for global network flagships; 
and iv) develop cross-border clusters. Of these, the first two objectives are problematic, while the 
last two indicate a move in the right direction.  
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The first objective represents an outdated concept of IU that assumes a fixed sequencing 
pattern from low-end, assembly-type subcontracting to “original brand name” (OBM) 
manufacturing (for a typical example, see Hobday, 1995). We now know that the transition to 
OBM is extremely difficult - even Taiwan´s Acer group has had only limited success (Ernst, 
2000a and 2000c). The limited achievements of the “Proton City cluster” in automobiles also 
indicate that this objective may be unrealistic. As for the second objective, much depends on 
whether the country succeeds in finding the right balance between reaping the benefits of foreign 
input imports (as described in Rodrik, 1999) and the development of local backward and forward 
linkages
35. 
b) Integrated Manufacturing Centers  
The third objective contains some promising elements. Take recent developments in the 
Penang cluster. For instance, rather than just giving in to requests for improved incentives by 
foreign companies, the state government pursues a more selective approach: incentives are 
explicitly linked with the promotion of “integrated manufacturing centres” (IMC).The goal is to 
induce global flagships to move to Penang an “entire chain of operations for a particular product” 
(Asia Computer Weekly Online, October 22, 2001: 4). It is expected that this should enable the 
Penang cluster to upgrade from mere assembly and testing to knowledge support services, like 
sales and marketing, adaptive process engineering and tooling, financial planning, and, eventually 
parts of R&D like design and development (D&D)
36. Table 10 provides examples. 
 
Table 10 Penang - “Integrated Manufacturing Centre” 
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An equally important development is attempts by the Penang state government to develop 
a “photonics industry cluster”. “Photonics” is the technology of harnessing light for digital 
applications, covering CD-ROMs, fibre-optic communications, lasers, sensing and measuring 
devices, and liquid crystal displays (LCDs). Penang has developed volume-manufacturing 
capabilities in all of these areas. Major global players in this sector, such as Osram, Agilent, 
Finisar and Solectron, are already active in Penang. In August 2001, the Penang Photonics 
Consortium (PPC) was established. Its main objective is to bundle existing activities into a 
dynamic cluster that could provide a broad range of contract manufacturing services in optical 
components. One of the main local players is Chahaya Optronics, a company that has received 
funding from the US based hard disk manufacturer, Komag Inc, and leading venture capital firms. 
The current downturn in the global telecommunications industry has drastically reduced 
the pace of these efforts. Firms are currently struggling to survive. But, in principle, the idea is 
sound, and the challenge now is to be prepared, once demand for optical components will grow 
again. A defining characteristic of Penang’s photonics cluster development are attempts to 
leverage multiple and diverse sources of knowledge and capital, both foreign and domestic, to 
create a critical mass for local clustering. For instance, the Penang Development Corporation 
(PDC) has organized two working meetings with engineers and managers from Taiwan’s 
Photonics Industry and Technology Development Association (PIDA), with a twofold objective: 
to learn from Taiwan’s experience, and to develop joint projects. Equally important are linkages, 
developed by the Penang Photonics Consortium (PPC), with US and Taiwanese venture capital 
firms. Finally, a concerted effort is under way, in cooperation with the Penang Skills Development 
Centre (PSDC), and several local universities, emphasizing photonics in their core curriculum. 
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5.4. Upgrading Linkages with OEMs 
The fourth objective of the IMP2 however is of greatest interest. Extending existing 
clusters beyond national borders originally was driven by two concerns: to ease the severe 
shortage of IT skills by establishing joint “Growth Triangles” with neighboring countries that 
would attract low-cost engineers from all over Asia. Yet, competition between Asian countries for 
scarce IT skills has drastically intensified, frustrating progress along these lines. It is time now to 
redefine the meaning of cross-border clusters, and to ask how Malaysia’s existing electronics 
clusters could reap greater benefits from participation in GPNs. 
We have seen that, as part of the concept of IMC, Malaysia was able to induce some 
OEMs to contribute to the development of specialized clusters. Such policies, which build upon 
earlier successful policies in Taiwan (Ernst, 2000a) and Singapore (Wong Poh Kam, 2000), can 
play an important catalytic role and need to continue.  
Yet, to a large degree, the outcome of these policies depends on sector-specific 
developments that are beyond the control of a mid-sized country like Malaysia. Accumulated 
agglomeration economies matter of course, in terms of human resources, infrastructure and 
support industries (e.g., Best, 2001; Ernst, Guerrieri, Iammarino, and Pietrobelli, 2001). They also 
need to be continuously improved. Beyond that, the availability of incentives may tip the balance 
in favor of a particular location, but only if all the other conditions are in place. Otherwise, 
incentives are a waste of money. 
A brief comparison of the cases mentioned in table 9 illustrates this point. The decisions by 
Komag and Quantum reflects the relentless pressure within the hard disk drive industry to move 
volume manufacturing and support services to locations in close proximity to Singapore, the 
dominant global cluster for these activities (Ernst, 1997b and McKendrick et al, 2001).    50
a) Footloose nature of FDI 
An especially serious concern is that much of Malaysia’s inward FDI remains highly 
“footloose” and prone to sudden relocation decisions to lower-cost locations. Equally important is 
that global flagships that are forced to downsize to retain shareholder value in a recession are 
inclined to cut first employment in export platform locations, reflecting their flexible labor market 
regulations
37. Table 11 provides examples for both cases. 
Table 11 Malaysia: Footloose FDI 
Of particular interest is the recent decision by Dell to relocate its desktop production for 
the Japanese market from Penang to Xiamen/China, and to assign Xiamen to be the exclusive 
supply base China for Dell´s complete product line. While Dell’s two plants in Penang remain the 
BTO shipment hub for the rest of Asia-Pacific (with the exception of desktops), this constitutes a 
major blow for Malaysia. While immediate job losses are only 60 (out of a total of 2000), this 
move to China indicates that more such redeployments may be in the offing. Dell gives three 
reasons for its decision to redeploy to China: good and low-cost Chinese engineers, cheap land, 
and the limited number of flight connections between Malaysia and Japan. This indicates how 
unpredictable and fragile Malaysia’s upgrading perspectives are.  
b) Upgrading opportunities 
But linkages to OEMs also provide important new upgrading opportunities. We highlight 
two examples: “embedded” software”, and RosettaNet. 
“Embedded software” 
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For Malaysia, important upgrading opportunities reside in “embedded software”, a no-frills 
program used in a broad array of electronic systems that does only the specific task it is meant to 
perform. The program takes very specific inputs from its usage environment, processes these and 
produces very specific outputs. Typical applications are car electronics, avionics, intelligent 
consumer products, communication and tracking devices, industrial automation and medical 
equipment. In Malaysia, examples include the joint software development projects of Intel and 
Motorola. 
These projects are in line with a general industry trend. There is a worldwide shortage of 
the specific skills required for “embedded software” development. It requires very distinctive skill 
sets that are closer to hardware design than mainstream software development. Essential 
prerequisites are an experience in manufacturing and hardware design, and state-of-the-art 
equipment and quality control. Places like Penang, with their accumulated experience in 
manufacturing and product design (even if it involves only product customization) apparently 
have some advantages relative to traditional software outsourcing locations in India, where there 
has been less exposure to hardware design. 
 
 RosettaNet 
Another interesting example is the RM 5 million grant allocated in the 2002 budget to 
promote the adoption of Rosetta Net e-business standards (interview with participants of PSDC 
seminar “Jump Start your e-Business with RosettaNet/XML”, July 11, 2002). RosettaNet is a 
global consortium of over 400 of the world’s leading OEMs and CMs for electronic components, 
semiconductors, computers and telecommunications equipment, working to create, implement and   52
promote open e-business process standards. Malaysia is the fifth country in Asia to join 
RosettaNet, after Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
Two tools are available to implement the RosettaNet initiative:  incentives and 
participation in standard definition. Out of the RM 5 million grant, roughly ten percent has been 
spent to set up the local operations of RosettaNet, with the Penang Development centre (PDC) 
responsible for providing the backbone infrastructure. The remaining RM 4.5 million will be 
given out to eligible companies with no more than RM 100,000 per company. The grant will be 
administered by the Small and Medium Industry Development Corporation (SMIDEC).  
The idea is to involve major global network flagships that are already on the RosettaNet, 
such as Cisco, Dell, Quantum, Siemens, Solectron, Intel, AMD, Hitachi, Agilent, and Motorola.  
These flagships could then be used to pressure and cajole their local suppliers to upgrade their IT 
infrastructure so that these local suppliers become eligible for the above grants. Another criterion 
for the grant is financial strength, i.e. the eligible company must finance out of its own funds 
another 50% of the project cost. It is however an open question, how the substantial constraints 
can be overcome that prevent smaller lower-tier suppliers to adopt the RosettaNet standards. 
Participation in the definition of the RosettaNet standards is probably the more 
immediately relevant tool. Six Malaysian electronics engineers, on loan to RosettaNet for two 
years, will work for six months at the California-based RosettaNet headquarters alongside 
American engineers to define XML-based specifications for the global electronics industry. The 
companies that provide these Malaysian engineers include global flagships (Intel and Microsoft), 
leading local suppliers (BCM Electronics, Globetronics Multimedia Technology), and two 
employees of MIMOS (= Malaysian Institute of Microelectronics Systems), a web developer and a 
public key infrastructure developer. Obviously, these six Malaysian engineers will play an   53
important role as multipliers and upgrading catalysts, once they return from their US mission. 
They will also act as gatekeepers for these more knowledge-intensive linkages with global 
flagships. 
 
5.5. Developing Multiple Linkages with Contract Manufacturers 
To what degree can linkages with contract manufacturers (CM) broaden Malaysia’s IU 
opportunities? Within Asia, two regions have experienced the greatest concentration of CM 
clusters: first Malaysia and Singapore (with a few additional sites in Thailand); and then, during 
the latter part of the nineties, China (see table 5). As for Malaysia and its neighboring countries, 
four important developments affect IU opportunities: the arrival of major US CMs; the acquisition 
of second-tier Asian contract manufacturers by major US CMs; the mutation of component 
suppliers from Japan and Taiwan into contract manufacturers; and upgrading efforts of Malaysian 
higher-tier suppliers. 
a. Arrival of major US CMs 
 All the main US CMs are now present in the Northern Penang/Kulim Hi-Tech cluster, or 
in the southern Johor/Singapor cluster. Solectron is present in Penang, Johor and Singapore; 
Flextronics in Singapore and Johor; Sanmina/SCI in Penang, and Singapore; Celestica in Kedah`s 
Kulin Hi-tech Park; and Jabil Circuit in Penang. There are also a few important investments 
elsewhere in the region, such as Malaysia`s Kuching/Sarawak (Sanmina/SCI), Thailand 
(Flextronics, Sanmina/SCI and Celestica), and Indonesia (Celestica). 
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The arrival of major global CM players thus far has created only limited upgrading 
opportunities for countries like Malaysia. Against our initial expectations, a website search for the 
above five global CM players conducted in December 2001 does not provide evidence that 
operations in Asia have significantly moved beyond manufacturing (table 12).  Compared to a few 
years ago, the main progress has been an increasing sophistication in assembly technologies, 
especially multi-tier SMT, used for PCBA. Most of the above sites now also routinely provide 
support services related to manufacturing, with the exception of asset and logistics management. 
Typically, this also includes electrical and mechanical design services, global test services, printed 
circuit board layout services and detailed process engineering (“advanced manufacturing 
technology research” in CM industry parlance). The purpose of these services is to provide 
manufacturing solutions that enable a quick ramping-up of volume manufacturing.  
A few locations, primarily in Singapore and Penang, are now also involved in new product 
introduction (NPI). These two locations are witnessing the development of original design for 
manufacturing (known as ODM) capabilities, but still on a very limited scale. Overwhelmingly, 
global CM players keep design (and especially circuit, advanced optical and systems design) 
concentrated in the US and Europe. One would of course expect such a disparity in design and 
product development, due to their high knowledge-intensity. This however is now changing, as 
Taiwanese contract manufacturers are now providing such ODM services (Wu, 2002). Industry 
observers expect that leading Taiwanese design firms will soon provide ODM services also from 
their overseas network sites in China, as well as in Singapore and Penang. 
A comparison with locations in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan also demonstrates an 
important weakness of CM locations in Southeast Asia. Very few final or system assembly 
activities are located in the Malaysia/Singapore clusters. Overwhelmingly, they are located in the   55
US and Europe, in close proximity to the traditionally dominant markets. But over the last few 
years, and especially in response to the recession in the US and Europe, leading CM have started 
to establish final assembly locations and BTO shipment hubs in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
The obvious motivation is to be as close as possible to the potentially huge China market.  
In short, the inflow of substantial CM investments thus far has produced some limited 
opportunities for Malaysia to move beyond its traditional focus on volume manufacturing. But 
these opportunities have not yet reached a critical level that would be sufficient for a major push 
into more knowledge-intensive activities. 
b. The acquisition of second-tier Asian contract manufacturers  
A second important development in Malaysia´s CM cluster is that leading US contract 
manufacturers have recently rushed to acquire second-tier Asian contract manufacturers, primarily 
in Singapore, but also in Malaysia and elsewhere in the region. These acquisitions reflect the 
concentration in the global CM industry that has rapidly increased over the last few years, driven 
by M&A (see figure 2 above). The turn to recession has further accelerated these concentration 
trends.  
Important recent examples include: Solectron which acquired the Singaporean contract 
manufacturers Natsteel Electronics and Singapore Shinei Sangyo (the latter an affiliate of a 
Japanese component supplier); Flextronics which acquired second-tier Singaporean CM JIT 
Holdings and Li Xin Industries; and Celestica which, through its acquisition of Singapore’s 
Contract manufacturer Omni (October 2001), has acquired facilities in Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia, with almost 9000 employees.    56
To the degree that these acquisitions will result in plant closures and lay-offs, the may 
constrain IU opportunities. However, there could also be positive effects, if these acquisitions 
insert new capital, customers and management approaches. 
c. Component suppliers from Japan and Taiwan  
A third important development in fact predates the arrival of American contract 
manufacturers that has absorbed most public attention. Part and component suppliers from Japan 
and Taiwan, whose arrival in Malaysia goes back to the second part of the 1980s, have both acted 
as catalysts for the development of Malaysia’s local support industries (e.g., Takeuchi, 1993, and 
Ernst, 1997b). Japanese component manufacturers have been concentrated primarily in the 
consumer electronics sector. Some of them, however, have also branched out into the computer 
sector. An interesting example is Kobe Precision (Malaysia), a company that, in Oct 2000, has 
been acquired by one of the leading Malaysian contract manufacturers, Eng Technologi Holdings 
Bhd (ETHB) (Business Times, Kuala Lumpur, Oct 27, 2000).  
Taiwanese firms have played an important role in Malaysia´s computer industry. 
Prominent examples are Acer Peripherals and Iventech. The involvement of both companies in 
Malaysia started during the late 1980s. Over time, the Malaysian affiliates of these and other 
Taiwanese firms have upgraded from simple volume manufacturing, according to designs owned 
by the global flagships, to sophisticated contract manufacturers for leading computer network 
flagships.  In addition to manufacturing, these Taiwanese affiliates now provide from their 
Malaysian sites product and component design, supply chain management services, and other 
knowledge-intensive support services. A handful of large Taiwanese contract manufacturers, led 
by firms like Acer, USI, Kinpo Electronics, Delta Networks, and Iventech, have pioneered the use 
of original design for manufacturing (known as ODM) capabilities in Asia (report by Technology   57
Forecasters, Inc., Alameda, CA, quoted in: EMS Insight, supplement on Circuits Assembly, 
September 2000). This apparently has forced major US-based CM players to follow suit. For 
Malaysian firms that interact with affiliates of these Taiwanese contract manufacturers, the move 
to ODM capabilities may provide IU opportunities. This example illustrates that FDI policies and 
incentives should not target only the world industry leaders. Wherever possible, these policies 
should try to bring in second-tier actors that are willing to bring along more knowledge-intensive 
activities. 
d) Upgrading Efforts of Malaysian Higher-tier Suppliers 
Our analysis of the US model of global contract manufacturing and its limitations indicates 
that there might be significant entry opportunities for higher-tier Asian suppliers to compete as 
low-cost niche contract manufacturers. Recent interviews in Penang (July 2002) indicate that 
leading higher-tier local suppliers all understand that they need move up within the hierarchy of 
contract manufacturing arrangements, from low-end box build, and consignment arrangements, to 
ODM provision, and total solutions provider. They are however facing major problems in 
sustaining and expanding their upgrading efforts. They all face the demanding challenge of 
pursuing  simultaneously the following upgrading strategies, each of which requires major 
investments: establish a credible position as low-cost niche contract manufacturers (CMs); 
develop global presence, through overseas FDI; diversification and market segmentation; develop 
knowledge-intensive support services; and invest in design and R&D. 
Take LC1, one of the most successful local companies. The company attempts to build on 
existing strengths in contract manufacturing and the provision of ODM services, to become a 
lower-cost  “total solution provider” for carefully chosen niche markets. To do this with low 
overheads requires strong capabilities in six highly interdependent functions: manufacturing,   58
quality, materials, procurement, engineering and human resources. It is important to emphasize the 
systemic nature of the required capabilities. 
The implementation of these upgrading options requires the development of a broad and 
diverse set of capabilities. Take manufacturing services. The move from PCBA and box build to 
test necessitates the development not only of testing capabilities ( which are scarce), but also of 
system engineering and maintenance capabilities. Furthermore, developing design & engineering 
capabilities requires substantial funds for R&D.  Or take after-ship services. A seemingly 
mundane activity like repair requires the training of technicians in failure analysis, while end-life 
program management requires capable supply chain managers. As for the upgrading of 
procurement and outbound logistics, substantial funds are required for the gradual upgrading of 
the necessary information systems.  
In short, the successful upgrading into an Asian niche market contract manufacturer 
requires substantial investments in training, equipment and facilities, and, most importantly, R&D. 
LC1 identifies the following seven challenges that result from the above strategy. First and 
foremost, substantial improvements are required for supply chain management and in the efficient 
use of the company’s assets. These are the most fundamental requirements for staying in this 
business. Yet, their implementation requires substantial resources and management attention. 
Challenges 3 to 5 constitute the medium-term challenge: the company needs to develop a strong 
portfolio of designs (so-called intellectual properties, or IPs); it needs to capture new global niche 
market opportunities; and it needs to develop a global presence. Finally, the last two challenges 
highlight critical changes in industry organization, i.e. the move towards flexible domestic 
supplier networks that can complement LC1’s own capabilities; and the overriding importance of 
human resource development, as a constant process of re-skilling and re-learning.    59
 
5.6. A Shift in Strategy (II): International Knowledge Sourcing 
a. Searching for new sources of productivity growth 
Despite impressive achievements, Malaysia’s knowledge base in the electronics industry 
remains too weak to sustain industrial upgrading into more knowledge-intensive activities. There 
is a heavy reliance on technological capabilities developed within affiliates of global flagships, 
and their eventual spillovers into local firms. This traditional transfer pattern however does not 
seem to work any longer. In Penang for instance, a disturbing slow-down in TFP growth has been 
observed since 1995 (State Government of Penang, 2001). Between 1995 and 1997, TFP declined 
by -0.5 for all manufacturing, compared to an increase of 8.9% between 1990 to 1995.  In the 
electronics industry, TFP growth fell to 2%  (from 14.1% during the earlier period), hardly 
sufficient for an industry that is supposed to be the engine of upgrading.  
As for TFP growth for all of Malaysia, most estimates put it around 1 to 2 % p.a. (until 
2000). This is way below the minimum TFP growth projected by the government of 3.2% (for the 
period 2001 to 2010), which is necessary, if Malaysia wants to achieve the projected growth rate 
of 7.5%. Compared with historical growth patterns of productivity in industrialized countries, one 
is forced to argue that this slow-down in productivity growth comes much too early. For Malaysia, 
such a massive slow-down in TFP growth is certainly premature, in light of the thus far still 
limited progress in its specialization by product and production stage.  
In short, while FDI by major global electronics OEMs used to play a catalytic role in 
boosting Malaysia’s productivity growth before 1995, they may no longer play that role. Except 
for China, and possibly India, OEMs are unlikely to increase their inward FDI in Asia. As argued 
before, these changes are structural rather than cyclical, and they are here to stay. Hence, Malaysia   60
needs to develop a set of alternative international linkages that could play a complementary role as 
external sources of productivity growth. 
b. The MSC concept  
A widely known attempt to address this issue is the government’s initiative to establish a 
$40 billion Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) that was supposed to leapfrog the country into fully 
developed nation status by the year 2020 (Multimedia Development Corporation, 2002). In 1996, 
the government had hired McKinsey, the global consulting firm, to draft a blueprint for a 15-
kilometer-by-50-kilometer strip intended to be Malaysia`s answer to Silicon Valley. An 
unprecedented set of incentives, enshrined in the Bill of Guarantees, were offered to companies 
involved in the creation, distribution, integration or application of multimedia products and 
services within the MSC.  
According to the Multimedia Development Corporation (2002), these incentives include 
commitments “to provide a world-class physical and information infrastructure; to allow 
unrestricted employment of local and foreign knowledge workers; to ensure freedom of ownership 
by exempting companies with MSC Status from local ownership requirements; to give the 
freedom to source capital globally for MSC infrastructure, and the right to borrow funds globally; 
to provide competitive financial incentives, including Pioneer Status (100 percent tax exemption) 
for up to ten years, or an investment tax allowance for up to five years, and no duties on the 
importation of multimedia equipment; to become a regional leader in Intellectual Property 
Protection and Cyberlaws; to ensure no censorship on the Internet; to provide globally competitive 
telecommunications tariffs; to tender key infrastructure contracts to leading companies willing to 
use the MSC as their regional hub; and to provide a high-powered implementation agency to act as 
an effective one-stop super shop.”   61
It is hard to find a more aggressive list of incentives. $3.7 bn have been spent thus far, but 
results are disappointing. A leaked confidential report by the very same company that designed the 
project (McKinsey) concluded in February 2001 that the Multimedia Super Corridor “ had not 
attracted much interest from global investors, nor made an impact on the domestic economy.” 
(Prystay, 2001)
38. In the meantime, the debate has moved on to explore what one can learn from 
this failure (author’s interviews with members of the National Information Technology Council, 
July 4, 2002, in Kuala Lumpur). Three conclusions seem to emerge: First, initiating the MSC was 
a step in the right direction. However, it is now time to expand its geographic coverage and to 
extend MSC status to other emerging electronics clusters in Malaysia. The Penang State 
Government in particular has been actively lobbying for such an extension, arguing that this was 
necessary to attract specialized skills from overseas on a contract basis to overcome its critical 
shortages.  
Second, lavish tax incentives and massive investment in infrastructure are insufficient to 
bring about the development of dynamic clusters. Especially for the IT sector, infrastructure is a 
highly perishable “public good”: the infrastructure for the MSC was perhaps state-of-the -art when 
it was established a few years ago, but it becomes obsolete very rapidly. Third, arguably the most 
important ingredient of successful cluster formation is missing: specialized skills and innovative 
capabilities. As emphasized throughout this study, the key to success is incessant efforts on a 
massive scale to continuously upgrade existing skills and capabilities. The lack of depth and 
horizontal mobility in Malaysia’s labor market increases the risk of individual investment in 
specialized skills. Therefore the importing of scarce skills should be given greater emphasis. 
While this seems to be obvious, this simple fact is frequently forgotten. In the case of Malaysia, 
                                                           
38 Some 500 companies, including 45 international ones, are located in the corridor. But the McKinsey report   62
the gap between the supply and the demand of specialized IT personnel has continuously 
increased, especially for engineers
39. In short, as long as this critical human resources bottleneck is 
not overcome, there is little hope that the MSC concept can act as a “breeding ground for 
technological innovations, new businesses and companies through the cooperation between the 
industrial and academic circles” (Takeuchi, 1997, quoting from official background documents).  
The following major priority areas for reducing the skills mismatch in the Malaysian 
electronics industry were identified during recent interviews with government agencies and 
leading companies (June/July 2002)
40: 1. A massive re-skilling and re-training requirements for 
production workers, 2. Graduates, especially for EEE, IT, circuit design who are able to combine 
hardware, software, and application knowledge; 3. Experienced managers, especially for strategic 
marketing, upgrading management, and management of international linkages; 4. Entrepreneurs 
that combine street-wise commercial and financial instincts with analytic capacity for strategic 
decision-making 5. Experienced and industry-savvy administrators who are willing to stick out 
their necks and to do more than just follow the rules (this of course requires some incentive 
alignment); 6. Incentive alignments for university professors and academics that encourage close 
interaction with private sector (company internships and sabbaticals); 7. dense interactions with 
expatriate nationals who are based in the US, Australia and Europe, or elsewhere in Asia; and 8. a 
capacity to bring in at short notice specialized experts from overseas who can help bridge existing 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
described the level of investment of those international electronics firms as “not very significant.” (Prystay, 2001). 
39 On this indicator, Malaysia is continuously ranked at the bottom in the annual World Competitiveness Report, 
lagging substantially behind Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and India. 
40 In Kuala Lumpur, I am especially indebted to discussions with Dato Prof. Dr. Zawai Ismail, director, Commerce 
Asset Ventures, who has set up brainstorming sessions with relevant government agencies and venture capital firms. 
In Penang, I am especially indebted to discussions with Tan Sri Dr. Koh Tsu Koon, Chief Minister of Penang, Dato 
Dr. Toh Kin Woon, Penang State Executive Councillor, Mr. Boonler Somchit, Executive Director of the Penang 
Skills Development Centre (PSDC), Dr.Ganesh Rasagam, CEO, DCT Consultancy Services, and Dr. Anna Ong, 
Senior Analyst, Socio-Economic and Environmental Research Institute (SERI).   63
knowledge gaps and who can catalyze necessary changes in organization and procedures required 
to develop these capabilities locally.   
c. Diversifying international linkages 
In light of the transformations of GPNs that we have documented in this chapter, Malaysia 
should exploit new opportunities for diversifying international linkages. Three complementary 
international linkages deserve particular attention: i) with foreign universities and research 
institutes, moving beyond the exclusive ranks of the “Ivy League”; ii) with information service 
and consulting firms, especially smaller, second-tier firms; and iii) with informal global peer 
group networks that now play an increasingly important role as carriers of knowledge. 
d.  Foreign universities and research institutes  
We have seen that current transformations in the organization of GPNs, accelerated by the 
use of digital information systems, have substantially increased the mobility of knowledge. The 
digitalization of knowledge implies that it can be delivered as a service and built around open 
standards. This has fostered the specialization of knowledge creation, giving rise to a process of 
modularization, very much like earlier modularization processes in hardware manufacturing.  
These developments may well create new opportunities for more aggressive forms of IU 
that no longer need to stay away from original knowledge creation. But, at this stage, this is 
largely uncharted territory, as these developments are very new, and there is practically no 
research. Nevertheless, it is time for a country like Malaysia to strengthen linkages with overseas 
universities that can help to upgrade research, development and design capabilities in Malaysian 
universities and public labs. The starting point is to correct the current policies. The focus thus far 
has been on a handful of global elite institutions that bring in their standard, routine IT and 
business courses at very high cost. Instead, collaboration should focus specific niche areas, in line   64
with Malaysia’s needs. Possible examples include certain areas of chip design, packaging 
technology, and photonics. Realistically, the search should move beyond the exclusive ranks of 
the “Ivy League” universities: there is ample choice of smaller, less well-known universities and 
research institutes that are more willing to develop innovative courses that are customized to the 
specific needs and capabilities of Malaysia’s electronics clusters. This may include institutions in 
countries like Taiwan (e.g., ITRI; ERSO, III, etc); Korea (e.g., ETRI; KAIST; ICU and other 
specialized research institutes), India (e.g. its well-regarded Indian Institutes of Technology, and 
the Indian Institutes of Information Technology). 
e. International consulting firms 
Equally important is a reconsideration of linkages with consulting firms. For information 
technology, these firms now play a critical role in diffusing both codified and tacit knowledge. 
The problem however is that this market is overwhelmingly dominated by a handful of giant 
corporations like IBM and consultancies like Accenture that grew out of global accounting firms. 
These firms thrive on the economies of scale of knowledge sharing (called “network economies” 
by information economists). As flagships of global information service networks, these firms 
provide a standard product wherever they go. Customization is possible only within the limits of 
these standard solution packages. This approach to customization is extremely costly: customers 
are charged for the time required for adjusting the standard IT package and for effective 
implementation, and these costs are inflated by massive delays. The result is that new systems 
often come in late, over budget and unable to solve problems they were meant to address. This has 
created a demand for smaller, specialized niche players that do not start from standard solution 
packages and that offer clients fixed-price projects. There is now a wide choice available of 
smaller, less well known but proven information service and consulting firms. This may include   65
also firms from some of the afore-mentioned Asian countries that have already some experience 
with knowledge-intensive information services. 
f. Informal peer group networks 
Malaysia also needs to tap into an increasingly important carrier of international 
knowledge diffusion: “transnational technical communities” (Saxenian, 2002) of technically 
skilled immigrants with business experience and connections in the US, Europe and Japan that 
play an important and complementary role to network flagships in global production networks. 
Such informal global peer group networks have created new opportunities for IU in formerly 
peripheral, economies around the world. By linking their home countries with the world´s centers 
of information and communication technology (encompassing Silicon Valley and other centers of 
excellence in less well known places like Helsinki,  Kista/Stockholm, Grenoble, Munich, 
Tsukuba, Tel Aviv, etc), these informal social networks transform what used to be a one-way 
“brain drain” into a two-way process of “brain circulation”. These networks generate invaluable 
knowledge on global market and technology trends in a way that addresses the needs of domestic 
firms much better than linkages with global flagships, or for that matter with global consulting 
firms. They also provide entrepreneurs and venture capitalists that can function in both worlds. 
This has created alternative and robust mechanisms of knowledge exchange across geographic 
borders and firm boundaries. Examples include Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, India, China, as well 
as Mexico and Brazil.  
In Malaysia, the Penang cluster has obviously benefited from students who have studied 
engineering and management overseas, whether in Australia, Japan, the UK and the US, and who 
have returned with business experience and connections. Predominantly, these connections have 
been with global flagships like Intel and Motorola in semiconductors, or Matsuhita and other   66
Japanese flagships in consumer electronics. Overwhelmingly, the technology, skills, and 
knowledge generated by these immigrant engineers has focused on manufacturing-related 
activities. It is time now for Malaysia to adjust this “brain circulation” to encompass new areas 
like knowledge-intensive support services, circuit design and chip packaging.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on operational definitions of key characteristics of global production networks 
(GPN) and industrial upgrading (IU), this chapter has explored how East Asia, and especially 
Malaysia, could build on recent transformations in the structure, coordination, contents and 
location of GPNs to promote a continuous upgrading of the electronics industry. We highlight the 
new opportunities and competitive challenges that result from these transformations, review major 
constraints to IU, and assess policy responses.  
The growing mobility of knowledge has created greater opportunities for using network 
participation as a catalyst for further IU. But realizing this potential has also become more 
difficult for mid-sized countries like Malaysia. The best choice arguably is to move forward in 
incremental steps, and to build on existing strengths in assembly and volume manufacturing, by 
adding knowledge-intensive support services. Of critical importance is the absorptive capacity of 
the local suppliers, i.e. their resources, capabilities and motivations. The absorptive capacity is 
shaped by pressures exerted by network flagships and by the existing incentives. To stay on the 
GPNs, local suppliers must constantly upgrade their absorptive capacity by investing in their skills 
and knowledge base.  
Equally important are attempts to strengthen the country’s innovative capabilities through 
selective international knowledge sourcing. Transformations in GPNs are gradually reducing the 
barriers for effective knowledge diffusion. As an immediate policy instrument, it is advisable to   67
import missing critical skills from overseas. This could help to catalyze necessary reforms in the 
domestic innovation system. The timing may be good, as massive retrenchments in the US and 
European electronics industries, and a more hostile attitude toward foreign researchers, especially 
from the Middle East, but also from Asia, may induce foreign researchers to work in Malaysia. 
Adequate incentives are required to generate sufficient investments in the development of 
skills and capabilities (as illustrated for instance by the Nordic countries in Europe, and by 
Taiwan, and Singapore). Policies towards both OEMs and CMs need to move beyond “incentive 
tournaments”. Infrastructure development is critical, but needs to move beyond a widespread 
“hardware” bias. As illustrated in this paper, successful IU within GPNs requires support policies 
for local firms through local supplier development, (co-funded) skill development, standards 
setting, and the provision of investment and innovation finance through a variety of sources, 
including venture capital, and IPOs. 
Of particular importance for East Asia are new opportunities to tap into international flows 
of human capital and knowledge through informal peer group networks of technically skilled 
immigrants with business experience and connections in the US, Europe and Japan. These 
international social networks can play an important and complementary role as carriers of 
knowledge and capital to OEMs, CMs and global consulting firms. While Malaysia has developed 
some of the most ambitious sets of policies and incentives, the country still has a long way to go to 
exploit these new opportunities.   68
REFERENCES 
 
Aberdeen Group, 2001, Offshore Software Development: Localization, Globalization, and 
Best Practices in an Evolving Industry; 
Almeida, P. and B. Kogut, 1997, “The Exploration of Technological Diversity and the 
Geographic Localization of Innovation”, Small Business Economics, 9: 21-31 
Ariffin, N., 2000, The Internationalisation of Innovative Capabilities: The malaysian 
Electronics Industry, PhD thesis, Science and technology Policy research Unit (SPRU), University 
of Sussex 
Best, M., 2001, The New Competitive Advantage, Oxford University Press 
Borrus, M., D. Ernst, and S. Haggard (2000), eds., International Production Networks in 
Asia. Rivalry or Riches?, Routledge, London etc 
  Boswell, D., 1993, Subcontracting Electronics. A Management and technical Guide for 
Purchasers and Suppliers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, London etc 
Bruton, H.J., 1967, “Productivity Growth in Latin America”, American Economic Review 
, December 
Bruton, H.J., 1968, “Import Substitution and Productivity Growth”, The Journal of 
Development Studies, April 
Chandler, A.D. (1977), The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American 
Business, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. 
Chen, Shin-Horng (2002), “Global Production Networks and Information Technology: The 
Case of Taiwan,” in: Industry and Innovation, Vol. 9,No.3, October, special issue on  “Global 
Production Networks”, editors: D. Ernst and Linsu Kim   69
Dahlman, C.J. and J.E. Aubert, 2001, China and the Knowledge Economy, World Bank 
Institute, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
DCT, 2002, Annual Survey of the Manufacturing Industries in Penang Development 
Corporation Industrial Areas, submitted to the Penang Development Corporation, Penang, 
Malaysia 
Depeyrot, M., 2002, “Taiwan Foundries Acquiring design Capabilities”, Electronic 
Engineering Times, 25 September 
Ernst, D. 1994a, "Network Transactions, Market Structure and Technological Diffusion - 
Implications for South-South Cooperation", in: L. Mytelka (ed.), South-South Cooperation in a 
Global Perspective, Development Centre Documents, OECD, Paris 
Ernst, D., 1994b, What are the Limits to the Korean Model? The Korean Electronics 
Industry Under Pressure, A BRIE Research Monograph, The Berkeley Roundtable on the 
International Economy, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, 129 pages 
Ernst, D., 1997 a, “Partners in the China Circle? The Asian Production Networks of 
Japanese Electronics Firms”, in: Barry Naughton (ed.), The China Circle, The Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington, D.C.  
Ernst, D.  1997b, From Partial to Systemic Globalization. International Production 
Networks in the Electronics Industry, report prepared for the Sloan Foundation project on the 
Globalization in the Data Storage Industry, The Data Storage Industry Globalization Project 
Report 97-02, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of 
California at San Diego (94 pages)   70
Ernst, D., 1998, “Catching-Up, Crisis and Industrial Upgrading. Evolutionary Aspects of 
Technological Learning in Korea`s Electronics Industry “, in: Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 1998, Volume 15, #2 
Ernst, D., 2000a, “Inter-Organizational Knowledge Outsourcing. What Permits Small 
Taiwanese Firms to Compete in the Computer Industry?” , in: Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management (John Wiley), special issue on “Knowledge Management in Asia”, Vol.17/2: 223-
255, August 
Ernst, D., 2000b, “Evolutionary Aspects: the Asian Production Networks of Japanese 
Electronics Firms”, In: Borrus, M., D. Ernst and S. Haggard (eds.), International Production 
Networks in Asia. Rivalry or Riches?, Routledge, London 
Ernst, D., 2000c, “Placing the Networks on the Internet: Challenges and Opportunities for 
Managing in Developing Asia”, paper presented at the Second Asia Academy of Management 
Conference, December 15-18, 2000, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, forthcoming in: B.A. Lundvall 
and K. Smith (eds), Knowledge Creation in the Learning Economy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 
Ernst, D., 2001a, “Moving Beyond the Commodity Trap? Trade Adjustment and Industrial 
Upgrading in East Asia´s Electronics Industry”, in: R.S. Newfarmer and C.A. Wood, eds, East 
Asia: From Recovery to Sustainable Development, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Ernst, D., 2001b, “Catching-Up and Post-Crisis Industrial Upgrading. Searching for New 
Sources of Growth in Korea’s Electronics Industry”, in: Deyo, F., R. Doner and E. Hershberg 
(editors), Economic Governance and the Challenge of Flexibility in East Asia, Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers   71
Ernst, D., 2002a, “Global Production Networks and the Changing Geography of 
Innovation Systems. Implications for Developing Countries”, Journal of the Economics of 
Innovation and New Technologies , Vol. XI, #6 
Ernst, D., 2002b. The Economics of Electronics Industry: Competitive Dynamics and 
Industrial Organization”, in: M. Warner and W. Lazonick. The International Encyclopedia of 
Business and Management (IEBM), International Thomson Business Press, London.  
Ernst, D., 2002c. The New Mobility of Knowledge: Digital Information Systems and 
Global Flagship Networks. in: R. Latham and S. Sassen (Eds.). Cooperation and Conflict in a 
Connected World. Routledge, London. (forthcoming) 
Ernst, D., 2002d, "Global Production Networks and Industrial Upgrading - A Knowledge-
Centered Approach", in: G. Gereffi, (ed.), Who Gets Ahead in the Global Economy? Industrial 
Upgrading, Theory and Practice, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (forthcoming) 
Ernst, Dieter and Paolo Guerrieri, 1998,  "International Production Networks and 
Changing Trade Patterns in East Asia. The Case of the Electronics Industry", Oxford 
Development Studies, Vol.26, No.2, June 
Ernst, D, T. Ganiatsos and L. Mytelka (eds.), 1998, Technological Capabilities and Export 
Success - Lessons from East Asia, Routledge Press, London etc. 
Ernst, D. and J. Ravenhill, 1999, “Globalization, Convergence, and the Transformation of 
International Production Networks in Electronics in East Asia”, Business & Politics, Vol I#1 
Ernst, D., P. Guerrieri, S. Iammarino, and C. Pietrobelli (2001), “New Challenges for 
Industrial Districts: Global Production Networks and Knowledge Diffusion”, concluding chapter, 
in: Guerrieri, P., S. Iammarino, and C. Pietrobelli (eds.), The Global Challenge to Industrial 
Districts. Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Italy and Taiwan, Edward Elgar, Aldershot   72
Ernst, D. and Linsu Kim, 2002,  “Global Production Networks, Knowledge Diffusion and 
Local Capability Formation”, in: Research Policy, 2002, special issue in honor of the 20
th 
Anniversary of Nelson and Winter`s Book An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 31/8-9, 
August 
Feenstra, R., 1998, “Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global 
Economy”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12/4: 31-50 
Globerman, S., 1997, “ Transnational Corporations and International Technological 
Specialization”, Transnational Corporations, vol6., #2, August  
Grossman, G.M., and E. Helpman, 1991, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, 
MIT Press, Camb ridge/Mass. 
Grossman, G. and E. Helpmann, 2002, “Integration versus Outsourcing in Industry 
equilibrium”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 117, #1, February, pages 85-120 
Hirschman, A.O., 1958, Strategy of Economic Development, Yale University Press, New 
Haven 
Hobday, M., 1995, Innovation in East Asia: The Challenge to Japan, Edward Elgar, 
Aldershot 
Jones, R. and H. Kierzskowski, 2000, “A Framework for Fragmentation”, in: S. Arndt and 
H. Kierzkowski (eds.), Fragmentation and International Trade , Oxford University Press 
Lakenan, B., D. Boyd and E. Frey, 2001, “Outsourcing and its Perils”, Strategy + 
Business, Booz-Allen &Hamilton, Issue 24, 3
rd Quarter  
Lall, S., 1997, “Technological Change and Industrialization in the Asian NIEs: 
Achievements and Challenges”, paper presented at international symposium on “Innovation and   73
Competitiveness in Newly Industrializing Economies”, Science & Technology Policy Institute, 
Seoul, Korea, May 26-27.  
Lazonick, W. (2000), Understanding Innovative Enterprise: Toward the Integration of 
Economic Theory and Business History, manuscript, University of Massachusetts Lowell and The 
European Institute of Business Administration (INSEAD), Fontainebleau, May 
Lipsey, R., 2001, “Understanding Technological Change”, East-West Center Working 
Papers: Economics Series, No.13, February 
Litan, R.E., and A.M. Rivlin, eds., 2001, The Economic Payoff from the Internet 
Revolution, Internet Policy Institute, Brookings Institution Press 
Luce, E. and L. Kehoe, 2001, “A Dip in Silicon Valley.”, Financial Times, April 19, 2001 
Macher, J.T., D.C. Mowery, and T.S. Simcoe, 2002, “eBusiness and the Semiconductor 
Industry value Chain: Implications for Vertical Specialization and Integrated Semiconductor 
Manufacturers”, in: Industry and Innovation, Vol. 9,No.3, October, special issue on  “Global 
Production Networks”, editors: D. Ernst and Linsu Kim 
MIDA (=Malaysian Industrial Development Authority), 1999, Malaysia’s Manufacturing 
Sector - into an Era of High Technology, Kuala Lumpur 
Ministry of Information and Communication, 2002, IT Korea 2002, Seoul, Korea  
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1986, Industrial Master Plan 1986-95, Kuala 
Lumpur 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1996, Second Industrial Master Plan, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia 
Multimedia Development Corporation, 2002, Unlocking the Full Potential of the 
Information Age, available at www.mdc.com.my/package/.   74
Navaretti, G.B., J.I. Haaland, A. Venables, 2002, Multinational Corporations and Global 
Production Networks: The Implications for Trade Policy, Directorate General for Trade, European 
Commission, Brussels, March 
Nelson, R. R.  and S. G. Winter, 1982, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 
Bellknap Press, Cambridge:Mass  
Nelson, R.R. (1990), "Acquiring Technological Capabilities", in:  H. Soesastro and M. 
Pangestu (eds.), Technological Change in the Asia-Pacific Economy, Allen and Unwin, Sydney 
OECD, 1999a, Boosting Innovation: The Cluster Approach, Paris 
Ozawa, T. (2000), “The ‘Flying-Geese´Paradigm: Toward a Co-evolutionary Theory of 
MNC-Assisted Growth”, in: K. Fatemi (ed.),  The New World Order: Internationalism, 
Regionalism and the Multinational Corporationjs, Pergamon, Amsterdam and New York 
Pavitt, K., 2002, “Are Systems Designers & Integrators “Post-Industrial” Firms?, in: A. 
Prencipe, A. Davies, M. Hobday (eds), Systems Integration and Firm Capabilities, Oxford 
University Press 
Penrose, Edith, T. 1959/1995. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Porter, M., 1990, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Macmillan, London 
Prebisch, R., 1962, “The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal 
Problems”, Economic Bulletin for Latin America, United Nations Economic Commission on Latin 
America, New York, Vol VII/1, February 
Prystay, C., 2001, “Malaysia Seeks to Lift Super Corridor”, Asian Wall Street Journal, 
August 24   75
Rasiah, R., 1995, Foreign Capital and Industrialization in Malaysia, St. Martin’s Press, 
London  
Richardson, G.B. 1960/1990. Information and Investment. Oxford: Oxford 
Rodrik, D., 1999, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness 
Work, Overseas Development Council Policy Essay No.24, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, MD 
Romer, P.M., 1990, “Endogenous Technological Change”, Journal of Political Economy, 
98: S71-S102 
Rugman, A. M. (1997), “Canada,” Chapter 6 in J. H. Dunning (ed.) Governments, 
Globalization and International Business, London: Oxford University Press. 
Rugman, A.M. and J. R. D´Cruz, 2000, Multinationals as Flagship Firms. Regional 
Business Networks, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 
Saxenian, A., 2002, “The Silicon Valley Connection: Transnational Networks and 
Regional Development in Taiwan, China and India”, in: Industry and Innovation, Vol. 9,No.2 
(August), special issue “Global Production Networks, Information Technology and Local 
Capabilities”, guest editors: D. Ernst and Linsu Kim 
Simon, D., 2001, “The Microelectronics Industry Crosses a Critical Threshold”, China 
Business Review, The US-China Business Council 
State Government of Penang, 2001, The Second Penang Strategic Development Plan, 2001 
- 2010, Penang, Malaysia 
Sturgeon, T., 2002, “Modular Production Networks: A New Model of Industrial 
organization”, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 11/#3 
Sturgeon, T. and R.K. Lester, 2002 ( in this volume)   76
Takeuchi, J., 1993, “Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN by Small- and Medium-Sized 
Japanese Companies and its Effects on Local Supporting Industries”, RIM.Pacific Business and 
Industries, Vol. IV, #22, Sakura Institute of Research, Tokyo 
Takeuchi, J., 1997, “The New Industrialization Strategy of Malaysia as Envisioned in the 
Second Industrial master Plan”, RIM Pacific Business and Industries, Vol. III, # 37, Center for 
Pacific Business Studies, Sakura Institute of Research, Tokyo 
Takeuchi, Junko, 2001, “Comparison of Asian Business by Japanese and American 
Companies in the Electronics Sector”, RIM Pacific Business and Industries, Vol. I, # 3, Center for 
Pacific Business Studies, Japan Research Institute (JRI), Tokyo 
Toh, K.W., 2002, “The Political Economy of Industrialization in Penang”, manuscript (the 
author is Penang State Executive Councillor) 
Too, T. and T.P. Leng, 2002, “Unemployment Situation in Penang”, Economic Briefing to 
the Penang State Government, Vol. 4, #4, April, Socio-Economic & Environmental Research 
Institute (SERI), Penang, Malaysia 
Ulvinen, T. L., 2000, “Are You Ready for Contract Manufacturing?”, Proceedings of the 
IEEE International Conference on Management of Innovation & Technology (ICMIT 2000), 
Singapore, November 12-15 
University Press 
Wong, Poh Kam, 2000, “Riding the Waves: Technological Change, Competing US-
Japanese Production Networks, and the Growth of Singapore`s Electronics Industry, in: Borrus, 
M., D. Ernst and S. Haggard (eds.), International Production Networks in Asia. Rivalry or 
Riches?, Routledge, London 
Wu, N., 2002, Design Trends and the EDA Market in Taiwan, report prepared for the 




APPENDIX   78
 
 














Revenues ($10 Billions) 81% CAGR Capital Expenditures ($ Billions) 
*CM industry includes Solectron, Flextronics, SCI Systems, 

















Revenues ($10 Billions) 81% CAGR Capital Expenditures ($ Billions) 
*CM industry includes Solectron, Flextronics, SCI Systems, 




   79
 
 























































































































                    Table 1. Contract Manufacturing Clusters in East Asia, 01/2002 
 
Company  Southeast Asia∗  Greater  China∗∗   Other countries 
Flextronics Singapore/HQ  
Malaysia 
•  Johore 
•  Johor Baru 
•  Melaka 
Thailand 
•  Samutprakarn 
Taiwan 
•  Taipei 
China 
•  Beijing 
•  Changzhou/ Jiangsu 
•  Doumen/Zhuhai 
•  Shanghai/ Wai Gao FTZ 
•  Xixiang/ Baoan Shenzhen 
India 
•  Bangalore 
Solectron Singapore 
Malaysia 
•  Penang 
•  Johor (1991) 
China 
•  Suzhou/ Jiangsu 
Taiwan 
•  Taipei 
Japan 
•  Tokyo 
•  Kanagawa 
Sanmina/SCI Singapore 
Malaysia 
•  Penang 
•  Kuching/ Sarawak 
•  Sana-Jaya FTZ 
Thailand 
Taiwan 
•  Taipei 
China 
•  Shenzhen 
•  Qingdao 













•  Penang 
Hong Kong: Asia HQ 
China 
•  Kanton/ 
Guangdong 





  ∗  = Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam 
  ∗∗  = China, Hong Kong, Taiwan   81
Table 2. Changes in Outsourcing Arrangements 
 
Activity  Traditional Approach  Emerging Changes 
Capacity planning  Deterministic 
•  capacity, service levels & performance requirements are  
fixed at contract closure  
 
Stochastic 
•  proceeding by conjecture 
•  reserve capacity that covers baseload 
•  up-scaling if product becomes a hit 
Production planning  Precise commitment 
•  product mix & linkages are determined at contract closure 
Rolling commitment 
•  aggregate capacity is reserved for contract period 
•  OEM reserves right to decide how to use that capacity just before 
actual production starts 
•  CMs must provide flexible production systems that allow 
alternative uses 
Product design  Frozen 
•  minimal changes in configuration 
Flexible 
•  allow for variations in availability of parts & components 
•  ditto for capacity 
•  faster turnover: extend successful lines with derivates 
Network governance  Strategy shapes structure 
•  develop network organization in line with given strategy 
•  control every aspect of value chain 
 
Iterative learning  
•  start outsourcing arrangement, without seeking perfect solution at 
the beginning 
•  correct as you go along 




•  unit cost reduction over a small range of production volumes 
•  limited scalability 
•  local, not global optimum 
 
Systemic 
•  combine unit cost reduction with extended scalability 
•  flexible use of reserved capacity 
•  focus on high-margin products & services 
•  “90% of the global optimum – fast” 
    82
 
 
Table 3a: Major Investment Projects in China’s Semiconductor Industry, since January 2000 
Global Flagships (100% affiliates) 
 Location  Activities  Investment ($ bn)  Capacity/Technology 
Intel  Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone, 
Shanghai 
expansion of chip assembly & test  0.302  •  Intel`s new 845 chipsets used with 
Pentium 4 processors 
AMD  Suzhou/Jiangsu Province  assembly & test   0.108   
Motorola  Tianjin  integrated wafer fab, assembly & test  1.9   
Fairchild China-Singapore  Suzhou 
Industrial Park/Jiangsu Province 
•  assembly & test for wide range of 
logic, discrete and analogue 
devices 
•  plans to outsource > 50% to local 
suppliers 
•  0.010 (2002) 
•  total: 0.200 
•  plans to use latest in IT to 
enhance cost efficiency and 
time-to-market 
•  120,000sqft (2002) 
•  total: 800,000 sqft. 
Philips  Dongguan/ Guangdong Province  assembly & test     
   83
Table 3b: Major Investment Projects in China’s Semiconductor Industry, since January 2000 
Contract manufacturers, primarily from Taiwan 
 Location  Activities  Investment ($ bn)  Capacity/Technology 
SMIC 
(= Semiconductor Mfg. Int’l. 
Corp.) 
Shanghai  silicon foundry    480,000 8-inch wafers at 0.25 micron 
Shanghai Grace 
Semiconductor Mfg. Corp. 
Shanghai 
(JV between Formosa Plastics 
& Chinese group headed by the 
son of PRC president 
silicon foundry  1.6   
TSMC  considering investment in 
silicon foundry 
    





Zhejiang  province 
IC assembly & test  0.0028   
USI Electronics 
(Universal Scientific 
Industrial Co Ltd.), 
a subsidiary of ASE 
Shenzhen  PC motherboards (Pentium 4) 
•  for IBM, via USI Co Ltd. 
Taiwan 
•  Operating revenues for 2001: 
$ 100 million 
•  Capacity expansion from 6 to 10 
lines 
•  monthly production capacity 
increasing to 400,000 units 
Siliconware Precision Ind 
Co 
Shanghai 
(possible JV with Shanghai 
Huahang Group Co. Ltd. 
IC assembly & test       84





 Location Activities  Investment ($ bn)  Capacity/Technology 
Shanghai Hongli 
Semiconductor Mfg. Co. 
Shanghai  production of 8inch & 12 inch 
wafers 
  
Sast Group  Shenzhen  2 wafer fab lines  1.2  40,000 wafers per month 
Beijing Xunchuang IC Co.  Beijing 
(JV that involves Chinese 
companies and Kingston, plus 
Taiwanese investment fund 
(Asia Pacific Technology 
development Corp.) ?? 
assembly & test  0.200   
China Great Wall 
Computer Schenzhen 
•  Pudong “Silicon Harbor”/ 
Shanghai 
•  JV with Kingston 
Technology, a US. (or 
Taiwan-based?) 
memory module vendor which 
owns 80% 
assembly & test    50,000 sq.ft. 
Beijing Huaxia 
Semiconductor Mfg. Co, 
Ltd 
  wafer fab    8-inch, o.25 micron   85
               Table 4 The Cost of Upgrading: Investment Costs of Wafer Fabrication  
 
Process technology  Minimum investment requirements∗   
6-inch wafers 
(0.5 - 1.2 microns) 
$ 200 million 
8-inch wafers 
(0.35 - 0.5 microns) 
$ 1.2 billion 
12-inch wafers 
(< 0.35 microns) 
$2.5 billion 




Electronics Industry: Performance Compared to Objectives of the Industrial Master 
Plan 
 
 IMP  Goals  Performance 
Production 11.0  30.5 
Exports 10.9  32.6 
Employment 5.5  21.l7 
Investment value  6,298  25,985 
Note: Figures for production, exports and employment are average rates of growth between 1986-1992. Those for 
investment are the cumulative total of investment approved between 1986-1995. 
Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1996, Second Industrial Master Plan 1996-2005  86
Table 6 Heavy Dependence on Input Imports 
 
 In Electronics Imports (%)         In Merchandise Imports (%) 
   1993 1994  1995 1996 1997  1998 1993 1994 1995  1996  1997  1998 
Korea Components 57.0 53.2  54.1 55.3 60.2 71.6 9.5 9.5 9.7 10.0 12.0 16.6 
 o/w 
Semiconductors 
34.8 34.0 35.7 36.8 43.0 54.7 5.8 6.0 6.4 6.7 8.6  12.7 
Taiwan Components  66.3 67.5  70.0 65.3    13.7 14.8 16.9  16.7    
 o/w 
Semiconductors 
41.2 43.9  46.5 43.1    8.5 9.7 11.2  11.0    
Singapore Components  48.0 52.9  56.9 55.4 53.4 56.4 18.6 23.2 26.0 24.3 23.8 26.5 
 o/w 
Semiconductors 
25.0 30.5 35.6 33.9 33.6 37.3 9.7 13.4 16.2 14.9 15.0 17.5 
Malaysia Components  76.5 78.7  78.1 76.7 72.8 78.5 25.3 28.3 28.8 29.6 28.3 36.7 
 o/w 
Semiconductors 
42.9 45.9 49.7 49.6 49.2 56.5 14.2 16.5 18.3 19.1 19.1 26.4 
Thailand Components  55.1 55.9  59.1 60.0 58.7   9.6 11.6 12.4  12.6  14.1  
 o/w 
Semiconductors 
26.4 26.8  28.7 30.2 29.9   4.6 5.6 6.0  6.4  7.2  
Philippines Components  37.8 40.3 43.7 54.7 34.9   5.8 6.6 7.7  20.7  9.4  
 o/w 
Semiconductors 
28.0 28.8  30.3 46.6 27.0   4.3 4.7 5.4  17.7  7.3  
Indonesia Components  46.4 48.6  46.3 37.5 33.8 33.9 4.4 3.5 3.3  3.2  3.0  2.0 
 o/w 
Semiconductors 
4.5 4.0 3.8 2.9 2.1 2.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Hong Kong  Components  38.0 38.1  39.7 39.6 40.5 40.1 9.8 10.4 11.6 11.6 12.5 12.8 
 o/w 
Semiconductors 
18.8 18.7 20.7 20.2 20.3 19.6 4.8 5.1 6.0 5.9 6.3 6.2 
China Components 40.9 43.1  44.3 49.6 55.0 53.1 5.3 6.3 6.9  7.4  9.2 11.4 
 o/w 
Semiconductors 
11.0 12.5 14.7 17.7 21.4 22.3 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.6 3.6 4.8 
Source: UN Trade Data Base Comtrade   87
Table 7. Asian Trade Specialization Profiles: RCA and Leading Export 
Products 
 
Country     Product              RCA              Share in Electronics exports (%) 
 
   '93  '94  '95  '96 '97  '98  '93 '94  '95  '96  '97  '98 
Korea  EDP  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.9 0.9  0.7 14.4 11.9 12.2 14.5 15.5 13.9 
 Storage  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.7 1.3 1.1 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.8 4.1 4.1 
 COMP  2.4  2.7  2.8  2.7 2.8  2.7 50.1 56.2 62.4 60.8 62.3 63.4 
 SC  3.3  3.8  4.1  3.6 4.0  3.8 30.4 37.2 45.7 40.3 42.9 45.3 
 Cons.  Electronics  2.3  2.4  2.0  2.0 1.7  1.5 22.5 20.5 16.1 15.6 12.8 12.7 
 Telecom  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.8 0.6 0.5 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.9 
 Memo:                    
  Share of Electronics 
in Merchandise 
exports (%) 
28.0  29.7  30.9  28.8 29.2  28.3         
Taiwan  EDP  2.5 2.7 3.0 3.4     39.4 39.0  41.6  45.0  44.62  45.29 
 Storage  0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6     0.8 0.6  1.0  1.3  2.10  1.97 
 COMP  1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2     37.2 39.3  41.6  40.2  41.93  40.86 
 SC  1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2     13.7 16.8  20.4  19.6  22.05  21.77 
 Cons.  Electronics  1.4 1.5 1.2 1.1     12.9 12.0  8.5  6.8  6.42  5.98 
 Telecom  1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6     4.9 4.8  4.1  4.0  3.59  4.20 
 Memo:                    
  Share of Electronics 
in Merchandise 
exports (%) 
29.5  31.0  34.3  35.8           
Singapore  EDP  4.6  5.1  5.1  5.4 5.5  5.2 40.7 38.6 39.4 42.8 44.1 44.6 
 Storage  12.9  13.4  12.8  15.3 12.4 11.4 17.6 15.7 16.0 18.8 19.3 19.8 
 COMP  2.7  3.4  3.4  3.6 3.7  3.7 29.4 35.4 38.5 38.0 38.9 40.7 
 SC  3.2  4.0  4.2  4.5 4.8  5.0 15.7 19.4 23.8 23.9 25.0 27.4 
 Cons.  Electronics  3.1 3.2 2.9 2.9 2.3  1.7  15.9 13.7  11.6  10.4  8.7  6.8 
 Telecom  1.1  1.2  1.1  0.8 0.7 0.6 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.1 
 Memo:                    
  Share of Electronics 
in Merchandise 
exports (%) 
53.0  58.8  60.7  60.7 60.6  61.4         
Malaysia  EDP  1.4  1.8  2.0  2.3 2.9  3.0 13.8 15.6 17.1 20.5 25.3 27.4 
 Storage  0.0  0.1  0.8  0.2 3.7 4.1 0.0 0.2 1.1 0.3 6.3 7.6 
 COMP  3.7  3.7  3.6  3.8 3.9  3.9 44.6 42.6 43.9 44.6 45.1 45.7 
 SC  5.6  5.2  4.7  4.9 5.3  5.2 30.5 28.3 29.8 29.3 30.1 30.7 
 Cons.  Electronics  4.2  5.0  5.1  5.0 4.1  3.5 24.2 24.2 22.6 20.1 16.5 15.1 
 Telecom  2.1  2.4  2.0  2.0 1.7 1.5 3.8 4.0 3.2 3.3 3.1 2.8 
 Memo:                    
  Share of Electronics 
in Merchandise 
exports (%) 
47.6  52.5  54.9  54.7 55.8  57.5         
Thailand  EDP  1.4  1.8  1.9  2.4 2.5    32.2 34.0 36.8 41.4 40.9   
 Storage  2.8 5.4 4.6 4.5 2.0    9.8 15.5  14.0  11.9  6.2   
 COMP  1.4  1.5  1.5  1.6 1.6    38.4 38.8 39.9 36.5 35.8   
 SC  1.7  1.6  1.4  1.6 1.7    20.8 19.3 19.5 18.8 18.3   
 Cons.  Electronics  1.3  1.6  1.4  1.5 1.7    16.7 16.4 13.3 12.0 13.1   
 Telecom  1.2  1.1  1.0  1.2 1.2    5.2 3.9 3.7 4.1 3.9   
 Memo:                    
  Share of Electronics 
in Merchandise 
exports (%) 
20.8  24.0  24.9  28.4 29.6          
Source:   UN Trade Data Base Comtrade   88
Table 8 Seagate: Shrinking Asian Manufacturing Employment 
Locations  Peak year  2002  Job Losses 
Malaysia  24,000 (1987)  5,500  - 18,500 
Thailand  40,000 (1998)  18,000  - 22,000 
Singapore  20,000 (1998)  9,000  - 11,000 
Total  84,000 32,500 -  51,500 
Source: company reports & 10Ks 
 
 
              Table 9: Job Losses in Malaysia`s Electronics Industry 
1998  1999 2000 2001 
(Jan to August) 
83,900  37,400 25,600 18,900 
Source: Government figures, quoted in: Hamid, H., 2001, “Lay-Offs Unlikely to be as  
Severe as Three Years Ago”, Business Times, Kuala Lumpur, October 3  
 
Table 10 Penang - “Integrated Manufacturing Centre” 
 
Year Company  (Product)  Remarks 
1999 Komag 
(world largest supplier of thin-film 
disks) 
Relocates entire US operations to Penang, except R&D, and sales& marketing 
2000 Dell  Computer 
(PCs, servers & storage products) 
•  Establishes Penang as BTO (built-to-order) hub for the Asia-Pacific region 
•  Decision reversed 1 year later, when much of these activities are moved to 
Xiamen/China 
20001 Quantum 
(hard disk drives) 
Plans to move to Penang entire manufacturing line for digital linear tape  
2001 Intel  •  For embedded 8bit processors, Penang covers all value stages, including 
design of chip & motherboard 
•  Plans to locate 2 new designs centers in Penang 
2001  Motorola  M’s software centers in Penang and MSC receive ACI level 5 certification 
























Company (product)  Remarks 
1998 Read-Rite 
(hard disk drives) 
•  Penang facility closed and relocated to Thailand and Philippines 
•  job loss: 4,000 
2000 Seagate 
(hard disk drives) 
•  share-holder driven downsizing 
•  closing facility in Ipoh →  job loss: 2,000 
 
2001 Seagate 
(hard disk drives) 





•  lays off 10% of its 4000 employees in its plant in Sungei Way, Selangor 
•  job loss: 400 
2001 Intel  •  Reduces worldwide workforce by 5 % 
•  Expected job loss in Malaysia: 500 
•  massive expansion in China 
2001 AMD  •  job loss in Penang plant: 1,300 (52% of worldwide job cuts) 
•  massive expansion in China 
2001 August  Dell  •  relocates desktop production for Japan market from Penang toXiamen/China 
•  Xiamen becomes exclusive supply base China for Dell´s complete product line 
•  With exception of desktops, Penang remains hub  for the rest of Asia-Pacific 
•  Main reason: limited flight connections between Malaysia and Japan 
2001 Lucent  •  closes its regional technology center in Malaysia →  jobs loss: 150 













Manufacturing & Distribution 
Supply-base & logistics management 
PCB assembly 
Flexible circuit assembly 
Complex systems assembly 
Build-to-stock systems assembly 
Build-to-order systems assembly 
Configure-to-order systems assembly 
Channel assembly 
Systems integration & reconfiguration 
Testing 
Environment stress screening 
Custom packaging 
Logistics & distribution management 
 
Support Services 
Repair – systems & PCBs 
Product refurbishment/remanufacturing 
















































































  Technology 
Interconnection & Packaging consulting 
Process development 
Reliability & failure analysis 
Manufacturing technology roadmap 





RF & wireless design 
Mechanical design 
Systems design 











































































a = will change: focus on China 
b= will change: Taiwanese ODM companies 
      Table 12 Contract Manufacturing: Geographic Dispersion of  Capabilities, 2001 
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